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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
State of South Carolina ex rel. Alan Wilson, in his 
capacity as Attorney General of the State of South 
Carolina, Respondent, 
v. 
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., f/k/a 
Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., and/or Janssen, L.P., and 
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Defendants, 
of whom Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is 
the Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-206987 
ORDER 
This matter comes before the Court on the petition of Appellant Ortho-McNeil-
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., for rehearing of this Court's opinion in State ex rel. 
Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Op. No. 27502 (S.C. Sup. 
Ct. filed Feb. 25, 2015). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and 
file a substituted opinion, which is attached to this order.1  While Appellant persists 
in pursuing issues not preserved for appellate review, we find it necessary to issue 
a substitute opinion to correct a mathematical calculation and to clarify that the 
unfair trade practices judgment against Appellant is supported by federal law,  
1  The separate opinion of Justice Pleicones, which has not been amended, is also 
attached. 
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including the federal "tendency to deceive" standard, and thus, complies with S.C. 
Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b) (1985). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July 8, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

State of South Carolina ex. rel. Alan Wilson, in his 
capacity as Attorney General of the State of South 
Carolina, Respondent, 
v. 
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., f/k/a 
Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., and/or Janssen, L.P., and 
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Defendants, 
of whom Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is 
the Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-206987 
Appeal from Spartanburg County 

Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27502 

Heard March 21, 2013 – Filed February 25, 2015 

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled July 8, 2015 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND 

REMANDED 
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Steven W. Hamm and Steven J. Pugh, both of 
Richardson, Plowden & Robinson, PA, of Columbia,  
C. Mitchell Brown, William C. Wood, Jr., A. Mattison 
Bogan and Miles E. Coleman, all of Nelson Mullins 
Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, Edward M. 
Posner and Chanda A. Miller, both of Drinker Biddle & 
Reath, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. 
John B. White, Jr., and Donald C. Coggins, Jr., both of 
Harrison, White, Smith & Coggins, PC, of Spartanburg, 
John S. Simmons, of Simmons Law Firm, LLC, of 
Columbia, Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy 
Attorney General Robert D. Cook and Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General Clyde H. Jones, Jr., all of Columbia, 
Fletcher V. Trammell, Robert W. Cowan, and Elizabeth 
W. Dwyer, all of Bailey Peavy Bailey, of Houston Texas,   
for Respondent. 
Gray T. Culbreath and Laura W. Jordan, both of Gallivan 
White & Boyd, P.A., of Columbia, for Amici Curiae, 
The South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, South 
Carolina Business and Industry Political Education 
Committee and The South Carolina Manufacturer's
Alliance. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Appellant Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals 
(Janssen) is a pharmaceutical company that manufactures the antipsychotic drug 
Risperdal. Risperdal is among a class of drugs prescribed primarily for the 
treatment of schizophrenia.  The Attorney General of South Carolina believed that 
Janssen had violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA)2 by 
engaging in unfair methods of competition by willfully failing to disclose known 
risks and side effects associated with Risperdal.  
On January 24, 2007, the State and Janssen entered into a tolling agreement 
concerning the statute of limitations.  SCUTPA has a three-year statute of 
2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -180 (1985 & Supp. 2013).
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limitations, as section 39-5-150 of the South Carolina Code provides that "[n]o 
action may be brought under this article more than three years after discovery of 
the unlawful conduct which is the subject of the suit."  The State filed its 
Complaint on April 23, 2007, seeking statutory civil penalties against Janssen on 
two claims.  The first claim arose from the content of the written material furnished 
by Janssen since 1994 with each Risperdal prescription, the so-called labeling 
claim. The second claim centered on alleged false information contained in a 
November 2003 Janssen-generated letter sent to the South Carolina community of 
prescribing physicians, the so-called Dear Doctor Letter.  Because both claims
arose more than three years prior to January 24, 2007, Janssen pled the statute of 
limitations as a bar to the Complaint. 
The matter proceeded to trial.  A jury rendered a liability verdict against Janssen on 
both claims. The trial court rejected Janssen's defenses, including the statute of 
limitations, finding that both claims were timely.  The trial court imposed civil 
penalties against Janssen for both claims totaling $327,073,700 based on 553,055 
separate violations of SCUTPA in connection with its deceptive conduct in the 
sales and marketing of Risperdal.   
Janssen appeals. Because this is an action at law, our review of factual challenges 
is limited to determining whether there is any evidence to support the verdict.  As 
for properly preserved questions of law, our review is plenary.  We affirm the 
liability judgment on the labeling claim but modify the judgment to limit the 
imposition of civil penalties to a period of three years from the date of the tolling 
agreement, which is essentially coextensive with the three-year statute of 
limitations, subject to an additional three months by virtue of the time period 
between the January 24, 2007, tolling agreement and the filing of the Complaint on 
April 23, 2007. We further remit the civil penalties on the labeling claim to 
$22,844,700. We affirm the liability judgment on the DDL claim, but remit those 
civil penalties to $101,480,000. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand for entry of judgment against Janssen in the amount of $124,324,700.
I. 

A. 

FDA Regulatory Process and Background 
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A brief summary of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) regulatory 
authority over the pharmaceutical industry and the evolution of antipsychotic drugs 
provides a helpful backdrop to the facts of this case.  "In the 1930's, Congress 
became increasingly concerned about unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing, and 
it enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)."3 Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 566 (2009) (citation omitted).  The FDCA's "most substantial 
innovation was its provision for premarket approval of new drugs."  Id. Following 
implementation of the FDCA, the FDA "required every manufacturer to submit a 
new drug application, including reports of investigations and specimens of 
proposed labeling" for regulatory review and approval.4 Id. "Until its application 
became effective, a manufacturer was prohibited from distributing a drug."  Id. 
FDA regulations require a new drug application to "include all clinical studies, as 
well as preclinical studies related to a drug's efficacy, toxicity, and 
pharmacological properties." Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
193, 196 (2005) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(2), (5) (2005)).
The FDA new drug approval process includes specific procedures through which 
warning labels are drafted, approved, and required to be included in the packaging 
of manufactured drugs. A drug label "must contain a summary of the essential 
scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the drug," and the 
label "must be informative and accurate and neither promotional in tone nor false 
or misleading in any particular."  21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(1)–(2) (2014).  Indeed, 
federal regulations set forth detailed requirements as to the content, the formatting, 
and the order of required information about potential risks and the safe and 
effective use of a drug.  Id. § 201.57(c) (2014). Specifically, FDA regulations 
require drug labels to include, inter alia: (1) "black box" warnings about serious 
risks that may lead to death or serious injury; (2) contraindications describing any 
situations in which the drug should not be used because the risk of use outweighs 
any possible therapeutic benefit; (3) warnings and precautions about significant 
adverse reactions and other potential safety hazards; and (4) any adverse reactions 
for which there is a basis to believe a causal relationship exists between the drug 
3 The FDCA is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
4 Prior to submitting a new drug application to the FDA for approval, the developer 
of the drug must first "gain authorization to conduct clinical trials (tests on 
humans) by submitting an investigational new drug application (IND)."  Merck 
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 196 (2005) (citations omitted). 
13 

  
  
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
 
 
 
and the occurrence of the adverse event.  Id. As these FDA regulations make clear, 
the category in which a particular risk appears on a drug label is a critical indicator 
of both the degree of the risk and also the likelihood and severity of the adverse 
consequences the drug may cause. 
After a new drug application has been approved, the drug's sponsor has continuing 
duties to the FDA to ensure the long term efficacy and safety of the approved drug.
For example, once drugs are approved by the FDA, the drug's sponsor is required 
to review, and report to the FDA, all "adverse drug experience"5 information it 
receives from any source, including adverse experiences reported during the 
process of post-marketing clinical trials.  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b), (c) (2014).  As 
new risks and side effects are discovered, a manufacturer must revise a drug's label 
"to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is 
reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need 
not have been definitely established." 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). As the FDA 
does not conduct independent scientific testing, it is incumbent upon sponsors to
disclose all clinical data to ensure the safe and effective use of drugs.   
Some have expressed a growing concern regarding the pharmaceutical industry's 
reticence to disclose negative clinical data, and the impact this has on the public 
health and welfare.  Indeed, it has been stated that: 
[T]he failure to disclose study results not only impacts clinical trial 
participants, but the health of the general public may be put in 
jeopardy as well. For drugs that have received FDA approval, post-
market clinical trials investigating new uses of the medication often 
5 FDA regulations define an "adverse drug experience" as: 
Any adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, 
whether or not considered drug related, including the following: An 
adverse event occurring in the course of the use of a drug product in 
professional practice; an adverse event occurring from drug overdose 
whether accidental or intentional; an adverse event occurring from
drug abuse; an adverse event occurring from drug withdrawal; and 
any failure of expected pharmacological action.
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2014).
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reveal important information concerning side effects and related 
adverse complications with the treatment.  To the extent that 
prescribing physicians do not have this essential data, they could 
inadvertently be putting their patients at serious risk by continuing to 
recommend the medication. 
Over the past few years, numerous scandals in the drug industry 
illustrate that concealing unfavorable research results is far from an 
isolated practice. . . . . In a quest to boost sales and increase 
corporate profits, the temptation to hide or selectively disclose clinical 
trial data has proven to be too much. 
Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to 
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 Miss. L.J. 705, 710 (2009). 
"The FDA's premarket approval of a new drug application includes the approval of 
the exact text in the proposed label." Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568 (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2008)). Subsequent to approval of the new 
drug application, a drug manufacturer must submit a supplemental application to 
the FDA in order to effect any changes in the drug label.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2008)).  "There is, however, an FDA 
regulation that permits a manufacturer to make certain changes to its label before 
receiving the agency's approval."  Id. (emphasis added).
Among other things, this "changes being effected" (CBE) regulation 
provides that if a manufacturer is changing a label to "add or 
strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse 
reaction" or to "add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and 
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product," it may make the labeling change upon filing its 
supplemental application with the FDA; it need not wait for FDA 
approval. 
Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).  
Following FDA approval of a new drug (or a new indication for an existing drug), 
pharmaceutical companies may begin to market the drug, subject to federal 
regulations. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 203.2 (2014) ("The purpose of this part is . . . to 
15 

  
                                          
                    
 
 
 
protect the public health . . . ."). Typical pharmaceutical marketing strategies 
include both direct sales calls (i.e., visits to prescribing doctors to distribute 
literature and samples) and academic writings and speaking events led by 
healthcare professionals. 
B. 
Risperdal 
Risperdal (risperidone) is an antipsychotic drug primarily used to treat 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is a chronic, debilitating mental illness that affects 
approximately 1% of the population.  Following onset, schizophrenia is a lifelong, 
incurable disease, and treatment almost always involves the use of an antipsychotic 
drug. Between the 1950s and 1990s, medical practitioners prescribed typical 
antipsychotics such as Thorazine (chlorpromazine), Prolixin (fluphenazine), Haldol 
(haloperidol), Loxitane (loxapine), and Mellaril (thioridazine) to treat 
schizophrenia. Although effective, these typical antipsychotics posed a number of 
negative side effects, including involuntary muscle movements and tardive 
dyskinesia, a long-lasting movement disorder.  
By the 1980s, clozapine was being investigated for the treatment of schizophrenia 
on the theory that it might be more effective and cause fewer movement disorders 
than typical antipsychotics. Clozapine was termed an "atypical antipsychotic" 
because it affected a different part of the brain than the older, typical 
antipsychotics. The medical community soon discovered that clozapine, too, had 
negative side effects, including agranulocytosis—a dramatic and sometimes deadly 
decrease in white blood cell count.  Thus, in spite of its efficacy in treating the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, clozapine was usually used only as a "last resort" 
drug, prescribed for only about 10% of the schizophrenic population.   
In 1994, Janssen introduced Risperdal in the United States as the second atypical 
antipsychotic drug on the market. In the first several years Risperdal was on the 
market, it steadily captured market share from typical antipsychotics, despite 
costing ten times as much.  From 1994 to 1996, Risperdal held a unique place in 
the market—it was promoted as being more effective than the older, typical 
antipsychotics, without the dangerous side effects associated with clozapine.  In 
1996, Eli Lilly (Lilly) introduced a third atypical antipsychotic drug to the market: 
Zyprexa. Zyprexa was dramatically successful when it hit the market, and Lilly 
and Janssen competed to capture the antipsychotic market. 
16 

  
                                        
 
 
   
 
Spurred by this fierce competition, Janssen developed a marketing strategy to 
distinguish Risperdal and protect its market share.  By 1998, Janssen was 
promoting Risperdal as having a lower risk of weight gain and a lower metabolic 
risk profile than Zyprexa.6  Despite the claims made by Janssen, post-marketing 
studies, some as early as 1994, revealed Risperdal posed a serious risk of 
substantial weight gain, increased prolactin levels,7 and hyperprolactinemia in 
patients taking atypical antipsychotics.  
6 In turn, Lilly differentiated Zyprexa as posing a lower risk for movement 
disorders and hyperprolactinemia, a hormonal imbalance causing serious and 
lasting reproductive side effects, when compared to Risperdal.  This type of 
relative comparison sales technique is not new.  See P. Lorillard Co. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, 186 F.2d 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1950) (involving advertisements claiming Old 
Gold cigarettes and the smoke therefrom contained lower amounts of harmful 
nicotine, tars, and resins and were "less irritating to the throat" than any of the six 
other leading cigarette brands).
7 Prolactin is a hormone that causes breasts to grow and produce milk and regulates 
reproductive functions such as menstruation in females and sperm production in 
males. Hyperprolactinemia is a condition involving increased prolactin levels in 
women who are not pregnant and in men.  Hyperprolactinemia can impair 
adolescent growth and cause enlarged breasts and the production of breast milk in 
both males and females. Additionally, elevated prolactin levels cause menstrual 
cycle disruptions in females and disturb testosterone and semen production in 
males.
At trial, the State presented testimony of Dr. Magali Haas, a Janssen medical 
research doctor, who admitted that Risperdal is associated with elevated prolactin 
levels, which are more of a concern for developing adolescents than for fully 
formed adults, and that scientists do not know if the reproductive dysfunction 
linked with Risperdal is reversible. During the relevant time period, Risperdal was 
not approved by the FDA for use in patients under the age of eighteen; however, 
Dr. Haas testified that "much of Risperdal's market in the U.S." was attributable to 
prescription sales for patients under the age of eighteen and that Janssen spent 
millions of dollars for medical marketing activities involving the unapproved use 
of Risperdal in children and adolescents. Moreover, Dr. Haas acknowledged that 
despite Janssen's awareness of the heightened reproductive risks Risperdal posed to 
17 

  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
This increased the long-term risk of developing various kinds of cancer, 
osteoarthritis, cardiovascular disease, and stroke.  Additionally, atypical 
antipsychotics greatly increased the risk of diabetes mellitus, which can have very 
serious, even life-threatening consequences.  By 1997, Janssen also had 
information that Risperdal posed a serious risk of stroke, cardiac arrest, and sudden 
death in the elderly. Despite this clinical information, it was several years before 
Janssen updated the Risperdal label to accurately reflect the frequency and severity 
of the risk of hyperprolactinemia, weight gain and diabetes, or stroke, cardiac 
arrest, and sudden death in the elderly. 
In 1997, Janssen commissioned a clinical trial (Trial 113) designed to establish 
Risperdal's superiority over Zyprexa as to metabolic side effects, including weight 
gain and diabetes. In 1999, the results of Trial 113 were not what Janssen desired, 
as the study concluded that there was no difference between Risperdal and Zyprexa 
in terms of long-term weight gain or the onset of diabetes mellitus.8  Janssen did 
not disclose or publish the results of Trial 113 and continued to claim that 
Risperdal was superior to Zyprexa in terms of these negative metabolic side 
effects. 
By August 2000, Janssen also received results from two epidemiological studies.  
One study was based on a review of the records of patients treated with atypical 
antipsychotics in a New England insurance database (ERI study).  The ERI study 
showed that Risperdal patients developed diabetes mellitus at a significantly higher 
incident rate than patients taking Zyprexa.  The second study was commissioned 
by Janssen (HECON study), and it concluded that Risperdal was not associated 
with an increased risk of diabetes mellitus.  By this time, and notwithstanding 
Janssen's furtive efforts, the risks and adverse side effects associated with atypical 
antipsychotic drugs were fairly well known.   
children and adolescents, no warnings or information about those concerns 
appeared on the Risperdal label because the FDA had not approved Risperdal for 
use in patients under the age of eighteen. 
8 Trial 113 showed Risperdal was significantly more likely than Zyprexa to result 
in increased prolactin levels. 
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In May 2000, the FDA asked sponsors of atypical antipsychotic drugs to submit a 
comprehensive review of all clinical data pertaining to metabolic side effects.  In 
response, Janssen did not disclose the results of the Trial 113 study but disclosed 
only the favorable results from its own HECON study, affirmatively indicating to 
the FDA that no long-term trials pertaining to metabolic side effects had taken 
place. The FDA's review was not thwarted by Janssen's efforts, as the FDA's 
investigation prompted it to request that product labeling for all atypical 
antipsychotic medications, including Risperdal, include a warning about
hyperglycemia and diabetes.    
Janssen was concerned that the FDA-mandated label warning would result in a 
substantial loss of Risperdal market share.  Notwithstanding the Trial 113 and ERI 
study results suggesting an association between Risperdal and diabetes, in October 
2000, Janssen's Associate Director of Central Nervous System Medical Affairs 
wrote an email to her colleagues urging that Janssen must avoid Risperdal being 
"lumped in to [sic] the atypical class for diabetes.  . . . [W]e need to work hard on a 
strategy to avoid risperdal being thought of as a diabetes-inducing medication.  
Instead, when worried about diabetes, we want doctors to prescribe Risperdal."   
Janssen then determined it would take control of how the message surrounding the 
new diabetes warning would be communicated.  Janssen officials' strategy was to 
"soften the blow" through what is known in the industry as a Dear Doctor Letter 
(DDL). The inspiration came from a DDL that Lilly sent to prescribers, informing 
them that the entire class of atypical antipsychotics was now subject to a new 
"class label" for diabetes and hyperglycemia.  A senior vice president for Janssen's 
parent company wrote in an internal email that "Lilly's DDL is pretty clever.  How 
much commercial liability would we incur if we sent a similar letter about 
Risperdal, assuming the FDA is unwilling to communicate the issue?"  
On November 10, 2003, Janssen disseminated a DDL, which did not include the 
text of the new diabetes/hyperglycemia warning, but stated: 
Hyperglycemia-related adverse events have infrequently been 
reported in patients receiving RISPERDAL.  Although confirmatory 
research is still needed, a body of evidence from published peer-
reviewed epidemiology research suggests that RISPERDAL is not 
associated with an increased risk of diabetes when compared to 
untreated patients or patients treated with conventional antipsychotics.  
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Evidence also suggests that RISPERDAL is associated with a lower 
risk of diabetes than some other studied atypical antipsychotics. 
To put it mildly, the November 2003 DDL contained false information.   
Additionally, in training its employees on the labeling update, Janssen 
communicated to its field sales team that Risperdal had a "0%" increased diabetes 
risk compared to placebo.  This was part of the message communicated to 
physicians in DDL follow-up visits with physicians. 
Meanwhile, by January 2004, Janssen had updated the Risperdal label to include 
the new diabetes/hyperglycemia warning.  Janssen determined that the negative 
sales impact had been minimal because of its deceptive efforts in the November 
2003 DDL. In other words, the November 2003 DDL worked, as far as Janssen 
was concerned, in protecting its market share. 
Thereafter, in April 2004, the FDA's Division of Drug Marketing Advertising and 
Communications (DDMAC)9 issued a "Warning Letter" to Janssen, characterizing 
the November 2003 DDL as "false or misleading" in violation of the FDCA.  
Specifically, the letter provided: 
DDMAC has concluded that the DHCP10 letter is false or misleading 
in violation of Sections 502(a) and 201(n) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (Act) (21 U.S.C. 325(a) and 321(n)) because it fails 
to disclose the addition of information relating to hyperglycemia and 
diabetes mellitus to the approved product labeling, minimizes the risk 
of hyperglycemia-related adverse events, which in extreme cases is 
associated with serious adverse events including ketoacidosis, 
hyperosmolar coma, and death, fails to recommend regular glucose 
control monitoring to identify diabetes mellitus as soon as possible, 
and misleadingly claims that Risperdal is safer than other atypical 
antipsychotics. The healthcare community relies on DHCP letters for 
accurate and timely information regarding serious risks and associated 
changes in labeling and the dissemination of this letter at a time 
9 This agency is now known as the Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP).   
10 Dear Health Care Provider, which is another term for a Dear Doctor Letter. 
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critical to educating healthcare providers is a serious public health 
issue. 
The FDA also determined that the scientific studies referenced in the DDL "do not 
represent the weight of the pertinent scientific evidence" nor did the DDL 
accurately describe the results of the cited studies.  As a result of the FDA's 
warning, Janssen issued a corrective letter in July 2004, acknowledging that the 
November 2003 DDL "omitted material information about Risperdal, minimized 
potentially fatal risks, and made misleading claims suggesting superior safety to 
other atypical antipsychotics without adequate substantiation, in violation of the 
[FDCA]." 
As to Risperdal's label, Janssen did not update the label to include a boxed warning 
regarding the risk of stroke, cardiac arrest, and sudden death in the elderly until 
February 2005, and no warning about hyperprolactinemia appeared in the label 
until August 2008.11 
C. 

The State's Unfair Trade Practice Claim 

In April of 2007, the Attorney General of South Carolina filed a state law claim 
against Janssen, seeking civil penalties under SCUTPA.  The State pursued two 
claims against Janssen, one in connection with the Risperdal label (the labeling 
claim) and the second concerning the November 2003 DDL (the DDL claim).  
Following a twelve-day trial, the jury returned a verdict on liability in favor of the 
State, finding that Janssen's actions with respect to both the labeling and DDL 
claims were willful violations of SCUTPA.   
11 To be sure, prior versions of the Risperdal label mentioned the risk of 
"cerebrovascular adverse events" in elderly patients, increased prolactin levels, and 
hyperprolactinemia; however, Janssen's categorization of those risks on the label 
underrepresented and minimized the frequency and severity of the risks associated 
with Risperdal. As noted, the category in which a particular risk appears on a drug 
label is a critical indicator of both the degree of the risk and also the likelihood and 
severity of the adverse consequences the drug may cause.  See 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 201.56, 201.57 (setting forth detailed requirements on the content and format of 
information on drug labels to ensure labels are not inaccurate, false, or misleading 
and convey all pertinent information regarding the safe and effective use of drugs). 
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After dismissing the jury, the trial court separately considered evidence and 
arguments during a two-day hearing to determine the appropriate penalty for 
Janssen's SCUTPA violations.  The trial court issued an order assessing penalties 
against Janssen of $152,849,700 for the labeling claim and $174,224,000 for the 
DDL claim, for a total penalty of $327,073,700.  This appeal followed.  This case 
was transferred from the court of appeals to this Court pursuant to Rule 204(b), 
SCACR. 
II. 

Analysis Concerning Liability
 
The SCUTPA was modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act, which 
provides "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). SCUTPA "declares unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in trade or commerce unlawful."  Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc., 358 
S.C. 369, 379, 595 S.E.2d 461, 466 (2004) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) 
(2002)). "An unfair trade practice has been defined as a practice which is offensive
to public policy or which is immoral, unethical, or oppressive."  deBondt v. 
Carlton Motorcars, Inc., 342 S.C. 254, 269, 536 S.E.2d 399, 407 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citing Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 326, 396 S.E.2d 
105, 108 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 309 S.C. 
263, 422 S.E.2d 103 (1992)). "A deceptive practice is one which has a tendency to 
deceive." Id. "Whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive within the 
meaning of the [SC]UTPA depends upon the surrounding facts and the impact of 
the transaction on the marketplace."  Id. (citing Young, 302 S.C. at 326, 422 S.E.2d 
at 108). 
The terms "unfair" and "deceptive" are not defined in SCUTPA; rather, in section 
39-5-20(b) of the Act, the legislature directs that in construing those terms, the 
courts of our state "will be guided by" decisions from the federal courts, the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), and  interpretations given by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC).  Thus, South Carolina has been guided by federal law, 
which recognizes the public interest involved and requires a showing of a 
"tendency to deceive." See State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 285, 294 
S.E.2d 781, 783 (1982) (quoting U.S. Retail Credit Assoc., Inc. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 
212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962)) ("'It is in the public interest generally to prevent the use 
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of false and misleading statements in the conduct of business . . . [and] actual 
deception need not be shown; a finding of a tendency to deceive and mislead will 
suffice.'") (ellipsis in original).  In State ex rel. McLeod, we followed the "Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals['] [holding] that the requisite capacity to deceive could be 
found without evidence that anyone was actually deceived."  Id. at 285, 294 S.E.2d 
at 783 (citing Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959)).
SCUTPA provides for both civil actions brought by private citizens and 
enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the State.  S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 39-5-50(a), -110(a), -140(a) (1985).  While the only section of 
SCUTPA at issue in this case is an enforcement action brought by the Attorney 
General, we note the distinction between the two types of actions.  In an action 
brought by a citizen under section 39-5-140(a) of the South Carolina Code, there is 
a requirement beyond the tendency to deceive element that the person suffer an 
"ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice."  
Thus, SCUTPA requires that a private claimant suffer an actual loss, injury, or 
damage, and requires a causal connection between the injury-in-fact and the 
complained of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-
140(a).12 
Conversely, in an enforcement action brought by the Attorney General, there is no 
actual impact requirement.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-50(a). The Attorney 
General "may recover on behalf of the State a civil penalty of not exceeding five 
thousand dollars per violation."  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-110(a).  "The legislature 
intended . . . [SCUTPA] to control and eliminate the large scale use of unfair and 
deceptive trade practices within the state of South Carolina."  Noack Enters. v. 
Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 477, 351 
S.E.2d 347, 349 (Ct. App. 1986) (quotations and citations omitted).  
12 "Under section 39-5-140, a plaintiff can recover treble damages where 'the use or 
employment of the unfair or deceptive . . . act or practice was a willful or knowing 
violation of § 39-5-20.'"  Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 23–24, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 
(Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton 
Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 477, 351 S.E.2d 347, 348–49 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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We note at the outset of our analysis that the State did not file this case because of 
concern with Risperdal's efficacy as an atypical antipsychotic.13  Risperdal, like 
virtually all pharmaceutical drugs, has risks and side effects.  The State filed this 
case because of its belief that Janssen engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct in 
South Carolina by failing to properly disclose Risperdal's risks and side effects in 
an attempt to mislead prescribing physicians and the public.  The jury verdict, 
which is supported by evidence, bears out the State's allegations that Janssen 
engaged in a systematic pattern of deceptive conduct.   
Janssen raises a number of issues in their appeal.  Many assignments of error are 
an attempt to relitigate factual disputes, which we are not permitted to do.  
Moreover, while we reach the merits of a number of issues, many are not preserved 
for this Court's review, and we address them only briefly. 
A. 

Opening and Closing Arguments 

Janssen claims that various portions of the State's opening and closing arguments 
were inflammatory and unduly prejudicial and thus warrant a new trial.  
Specifically, Janssen claims that the State invited the jury to impose liability on the 
basis of Janssen's size and commercial success by repeatedly referring to Janssen's 
profits from selling Risperdal and claiming that Janssen put "profits over safety." 
We find that Janssen's arguments on appeal are procedurally barred.  Although 
Janssen noted a generalized "continuing objection" at the outset of trial, apparently 
believing it could make a more specific after-the-fact objection to any alleged 
13 Similar Risperdal litigation against Janssen and its parent company, Johnson & 
Johnson, has been ongoing throughout the United States.  In November 2013, 
Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay more than $2.2 billion in civil and criminal 
settlements with the United States Department of Justice to resolve claims that it 
improperly marketed Risperdal.   
Following oral argument, we received supplemental citations filed by Janssen 
regarding similar litigation in Louisiana and Arkansas.  After closely examining 
the reported decisions in those states, we have determined that the cases involve 
statutory claims which do not mirror the SCUTPA.    
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improper argument or evidence, such an approach is wholly inconsistent with our 
law requiring a contemporaneous objection.  See Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 
200, 165 S.E.2d 797, 807 (1969) ("[T]he proper course to be pursued when counsel 
makes an improper argument is for opposing counsel to immediately object and to 
have a record made of the statements or language complained of and to ask the 
court for a distinct ruling thereon." (citing Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 424, 
126 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1962))). This rule is designed to enable the trial court to 
timely address and remedy a founded objection.  See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 
S.C. 461, 465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) ("'Issue preservation rules are designed 
to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the issues, and thus provide us 
with a platform for meaningful appellate review.'" (quoting Queen's Grant II 
Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 368 S.C. 342, 373, 628 S.E.2d 
902, 919 (Ct. App. 2006))). Here, absent a contemporaneous objection identifying 
the particular comments complained of and the basis for the objection, Janssen has 
waived its right to complain about this issue on appeal.  Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
364 S.C. 639, 655, 615 S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (holding that the failure to 
contemporaneously object precluded the defendant from raising an issue on appeal 
(citing Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 212, 479 S.E.2d 35, 41 (1996))).14 
Moreover, Janssen's "continuing objection" at trial concerning the propriety of 
counsel's statements to the jury was limited to relevance, which is an entirely 
different basis than the inflammatory/unduly prejudicial argument that Janssen 
now advances on appeal. Thus, even generously construing Janssen's pre-trial 
objection as sufficient to preserve the objection, Janssen's claim is nonetheless 
procedurally barred from appellate review because Janssen argues a different basis 
on appeal than was argued at trial. State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 
14 We acknowledge the rule in South Carolina that counsel is not required to harass 
the trial judge by making continued objections after an issue has been ruled upon.  
See Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 45–46, 426 S.E.2d 
756, 758 (1993) (noting that where a trial judge has fair opportunity to consider 
and rule upon an issue, it is not incumbent upon counsel "to harass the judge by 
parading the issue before [the trial judge] again").  However, that is not the 
situation before us, for Janssen failed to bring to the trial court's attention any of 
the comments of which it now complains or specify the basis for its objection, 
much less obtain a ruling from the trial court.  Thus, because the trial court did not 
have a fair opportunity to consider and rule upon Janssen's specific objections, it 
was incumbent upon Janssen's counsel to object contemporaneously.  
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691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate 
ground on appeal." (citing State v. Prioleau, 345 S.C. 404, 411, 548 S.E.2d 213, 
216 (2001); State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 157, 526 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2000))). 
Janssen's claims of error are without merit in any event.  Janssen relies on our 
holding in Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010), in 
urging this Court to order a new trial. In Branham, the plaintiff's attorney strayed 
beyond the parameters of permissible jury argument and sought punitive damages 
for the damage caused to non-parties. Id. at 235, 701 S.E.2d at 22. We ordered a 
new trial, holding that "[t]he closing argument invited the jury to base its verdict on 
passion rather than reason. . . . [and] denied [defendant] a fair trial."  Id. We find 
that Branham is readily distinguishable from this case.  Here, counsel for the State 
directly linked the elements of SCUTPA to Janssen's misleading and deceptive 
practices and its motivations to retain (and increase) Risperdal market share.  Such 
arguments were within proper bounds as the State sought to establish that Janssen 
acted willfully and contrary to the public interest.  In addition, the nature of 
counsel's comments is more closely associated with what Janssen believes was a 
grossly excessive award of civil penalties, and the jury's role was limited to 
determining liability.  The jury had no role in determining the amount of the civil 
penalties. 
B. 

Admission of 1994, 1999, and 2004 DDMAC Letters 

Janssen argues that the admission of several DDMAC letters was reversible error 
because the letters constitute inadmissible hearsay and should also have been 
excluded under Rule 403, SCRE.  Once again, we find that Janssen has not 
preserved these assignments of error for appellate review.15  Even if we were to 
15  Janssen's contemporaneous objection at trial to admission of the 1994 DDMAC 
letter was on the basis of relevance, not on the basis of hearsay or Rule 403, SCRE.  
See Talley v. S.C. Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Comm., 289 S.C. 483, 487, 347 
S.E.2d 99, 101 (1986) ("It is an axiomatic rule of law that issues may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal." (citing Am. Hardware Supply Co. v. Whitmire, 278 
S.C. 607, 609, 300 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1983))).  While it appears that Janssen was 
more specific in objecting to the admission of the 1999 DDMAC letter—objecting 
on relevancy, hearsay, and Rule 403, SCRE grounds—the trial judge did not 
specifically rule on the hearsay or Rule 403, SCRE, issues.  Thus, Janssen's 
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reach the merits of these claims, however, we would affirm the admission of these 
letters pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR.  This evidence was relevant to the 
issue of liability and concomitantly the statute of limitations concerning the 
labeling claim, which, as discussed below, inures to Janssen's benefit.  
C. 

Adverse Impact 

Janssen argues that the State's SCUTPA claims fail as a matter of law because the 
State failed to show that Janssen's unfair and deceptive conduct had an adverse 
impact within South Carolina.  We disagree, for the conflicting evidence presented 
a jury question as to whether Janssen had violated SCUTPA.  Concerning the 
"adverse impact" legal argument, we reject Janssen's attempt to ascribe an injury-
in-fact element in an individual claim to an Attorney General directed claim.16 
assignment of error is not preserved for appellate review.  Kleckley v. Nw. Nat. 
Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 138, 526 S.E.2d 218, 221 (2000) (citing Anonymous (M-
156-90) v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 329 S.C. 371, 375, 496 S.E.2d 17, 18–19 
(1998); Camp v. Springs Mortg. Corp., 310 S.C. 514, 516, 426 S.E.2d 304, 305 
(1993)) ("An issue not raised to or addressed by the trial court or the Court of 
Appeals is not properly preserved for review by the Supreme Court . . . ."). 
Regarding the 2004 DDMAC letter, no challenge is preserved for our review.  
Janssen's pre-trial objection to admission of the letter was only with regard to use 
or mention of the letter during opening statements, and Janssen's counsel did not 
state the specific grounds for the objection. Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 
76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n objection must be sufficiently specific to 
inform the trial court of the point being urged by the objector.") (citation omitted). 
16  After this Court issued its initial opinion, Janssen filed a petition for rehearing.  
This substituted opinion is in response to Janssen's rehearing petition, primarily to 
correct the calculation of the penalty associated with the labeling claim.  In the 
rehearing petition, however, Janssen candidly acknowledges that federal standards 
"do not require enforcement authorities to prove actual injury or actual deception."  
Petition for Rehearing, p. 10 ("[FTC] standards do not require enforcement 
authorities to prove actual injury or actual deception in order to prevail.  As the 
FTC Guidances state, an 'unfair' practices claim may be based on proof that 
conduct is 'likely' to cause substantial injury, and a 'deceptive' practices claim may 
be based on evidence that representations have a 'tendency' to deceive considered 
27 

  
 
  
                                                                                                                             
   
 
Janssen's attempt to judicially impose an injury-in-fact element to an Attorney 
General initiated SCUTPA claim is nothing more than an "if we lied, nobody fell 
for it" defense, which we reject.   
The provisions of SCUTPA allow three types of enforcement actions:  (1) lawsuits 
initiated by the Attorney General seeking injunctive relief; (2) lawsuits by the 
Attorney General seeking civil penalties; or (3) lawsuits by private parties who 
have suffered ascertainable losses. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-50, -110, -140; see 
also Michael R. Smith, Note, Recent Developments Under the South Carolina 
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 543, 543–44 (1993) (discussing 
generally various provisions of SCUTPA).  Although this case is an appeal from a 
lawsuit by the Attorney General seeking civil penalties, we note some important 
distinctions between actions brought by the Attorney General and those brought by 
private parties. 
To recover actual damages under SCUTPA, a private claimant must suffer an 
actual loss, injury, or damages, and the claimant must demonstrate a causal 
connection between the injury-in-fact and the complained of unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices. S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a).  Additionally, a private party may 
recover treble damages if the unlawful acts at issue are determined to be willful or 
knowing. Id. On the other hand, where the Attorney General files suit on behalf of 
the State, he is not required to show any injury-in-fact to recover a civil penalty.17 
in light of the knowledge and sophistication of the group to whom they are 
directed.").
17 Other states have similar provisions.  See, e.g., Mulligan v. QVC, Inc., 888 
N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) ("Although the Attorney General may 
prosecute a violation of the [Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices] 
Act without showing that any person has in fact been damaged, it is well settled 
that in order to maintain a private cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act, a 
plaintiff must prove that she suffered actual damage as a result of a violation of the 
Act." (citation omitted)); Edmonds v. Hough, 344 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011) ("The [Merchandising Practices] Act eliminates the need for the Attorney 
General to prove intent to defraud or reliance in order for the court to find that a 
defendant has engaged in unlawful practices.  Intent and reliance are not necessary 
elements of the cause of action." (quotations and citations omitted)).  We 
recognize, however, there are jurisdictions that require the state to show an injury-
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See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-110, -140.  Rather, SCUTPA allows the Attorney 
General to recover statutory damages of up to $5,000 per violation upon a showing 
that the unlawful acts at issue are willful.18  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-110(a).  If the 
Attorney General determines that an enforcement action "would be in the public 
interest," he is statutorily authorized to proceed without making any such showing 
of injury-in-fact or reliance.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-50(a).  As noted above, the 
Attorney General must establish that a defendant's conduct has a tendency to 
deceive. 
Indeed, the "in the public interest" aspect of an Attorney General SCUTPA claim
mirrors one of the underlying purposes of the FTCA—namely, "to make clear that 
the protection of the consumer from unfair trade practices, equally with the 
protection of competitors and the competitive process, is a concern of public 
policy." Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and 
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 
8324, 8349 (1964). As the Federal Trade Commission has stated, most 
in-fact as an element of unfair trade practice type claim.  Following oral argument 
in this case, Janssen has submitted supplemental authority consisting of court 
decisions from other states reversing trial court verdicts against Janssen.  We have 
carefully reviewed those decisions and conclude they are not persuasive, for the 
cases submitted by Janssen involve different claims with elements that do not 
mirror the South Carolina UTPA.    
18 "[A] willful violation occurs when the party committing the violation knew or 
should have known that his conduct" was unlawful.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-
110(c). In addition to the civil penalty, the Attorney General is authorized to seek 
injunctive relief when he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person is using, 
has used or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by § 39-5-20 to be 
unlawful." S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-50(a).  To be sure, the legislature has granted 
the Attorney General broad investigative powers.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-
70(a) ("When it appears to the Attorney General that a person has engaged in, is 
engaging in, or is about to engage in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by 
this article[,] . . . [he may serve] an investigative demand . . . .").  While an 
individual statutory claim necessarily includes an injury-in-fact element, an 
Attorney General initiated claim does not. It is the protection of the people of 
South Carolina that lies at the center of an Attorney General directed claim.     
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enforcement actions are brought "not to second-guess the wisdom of particular 
consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that
unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of 
consumer decisionmaking."  Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on 
Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Unfairness Policy Statement], available at
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness. 
Thus, Janssen misconstrues the legislature's manifest purpose in providing for an 
Attorney General directed claim, for a SCUTPA action brought by the State is to 
protect the citizens of South Carolina from unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct 
of any trade or commerce.19  Janssen's contention to the contrary is not only 
fundamentally at odds with unambiguous legislative intent in authorizing an 
Attorney General SCUTPA claim, but is also inconsistent with well-established 
law. 
On the issue of liability, our case law interpreting and applying SCUTPA is 
clear—while a private party SCUTPA action requires the traditional showing of an 
injury, an action brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the State contains 
no actual injury element. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, although the 
State had the burden of proving Janssen's representations had a tendency to 
deceive, the State was not required to show actual deception or that those 
representations caused any appreciable injury-in-fact or adversely impacted the 
marketplace. The tendency to deceive standard is derived from federal law and is 
therefore in compliance with section 39-5-20(b).  See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 
311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding "an advertisement is deceptive under the [FTCA] 
if it is likely to mislead consumers") (emphasis added); Trans World Accounts, Inc. 
v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Proof of actual deception is 
unnecessary to establish a violation of Section 5 [of the FTCA].  
Misrepresentations are condemned if they possess a tendency to deceive.") 
(emphasis added); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) 
("[T]he tendency of the advertising to deceive must be judged by viewing it as a 
whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their context.  An 
intent to deceive is not an element of a deceptive advertising charge under [the 
FTCA]. Moreover, the FTC has been sustained in finding that advertising is 
19 In terms of public policy, the South Carolina Constitution provides that "[t]he 
health, welfare, and safety of the lives and property of the people of this 
State . . . are matters of public concern."  S.C. Const. art. XII, § 1.    
30 

  
 
 
 
 
misleading even absent evidence of that actual effect on customers; the likelihood 
or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is measured.") 
(emphasis added); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957) ("One of 
the objects of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to eradicate business methods 
having a capacity to deceive.") (emphasis added); Federal Trade Commission, 
Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Policy Statement on 
Deception], available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-
statement-deception (noting that in evaluating conduct, "[t]he issue is whether the 
act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it causes actual deceptions") 
(emphasis added). 
We find ample support in the record that the State presented sufficient evidence for 
the SCUTPA claim to go to the jury.   Although we reject Janssen's effort to 
impose an injury-in-fact element in an Attorney General initiated claim, we believe 
the argument carries persuasive weight in the assessment of an appropriate penalty, 
which we address in the penalty section.  
D. 

Exclusion of Dr. Wecker's Expert Testimony 

Janssen claims that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. William
Wecker, an expert statistician whose testimony, according to Janssen, would have 
shown that Janssen's representations in the Risperdal label and the November 2003 
DDL had no impact on any prescribing physicians.  The import of Dr. Wecker's 
testimony would have been that, notwithstanding Janssen's false representations, 
the community of prescribing physicians was well aware of the risks and side 
effects of Risperdal. 
We are again presented with an issue that was not properly preserved for appellate 
review. When the trial court filed its order on February 25, 2011, excluding the 
testimony of Dr. Wecker on relevancy grounds, Janssen waited until March 21, 
2011, to make an offer of proof of his testimony.  The offer of proof came too late. 
TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Rev., 331 S.C. 611, 628, 503 S.E.2d 471, 480 
(1998) (noting that a failure to make a proffer of what an excluded witness's 
testimony would have been precludes appellate review); see also Greenville Mem'l 
Auditorium v. Martin, 301 S.C. 242, 244, 391 S.E.2d 546, 547 (1990) ("An alleged 
erroneous exclusion of evidence is not a basis for establishing prejudice on appeal 
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in absence of an adequate proffer of evidence in the court below." (citations 
omitted)).20 
On the merits, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, we would not find 
reversible error in any event.  We do acknowledge there was evidence presented, 
which otherwise tended to support Janssen's thesis that its deceptive conduct had 
no effect on the community of prescribing physicians, for they knew the truth 
concerning the risks and side effects associated with Risperdal.  Excluding Dr. 
Wecker's testimony, therefore, resulted in no prejudice to Janssen.  Yet, as 
discussed above, Janssen's relevancy argument is based on the false premise that 
actual harm resulting from the deceptive conduct is a necessary element of an 
Attorney General directed claim.   
E. 

First Amendment 

Janssen argues that the liability verdict and the penalty award impermissibly 
restrict its right to free speech.  We disagree. 
Again, Janssen has not preserved this issue for review.  Although Janssen 
requested a First Amendment jury instruction and raised the issue in its motion for 
JNOV, Janssen failed to raise any First Amendment issues in its motion for a 
directed verdict. Janssen's failure to raise this issue in its motion for a directed 
verdict precludes any appellate review.  In re McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 93, 551 
S.E.2d 235, 238 (2001) ("[S]ince only grounds raised in the directed verdict 
motion may properly be reasserted in the jnov motion, and since no grounds were 
raised in the directed verdict motion, no jnov claim is preserved for our review." 
(citing Duncan v. Hampton Cnty. Sch. Dist. #2, 335 S.C. 535, 545, 517 S.E.2d 449, 
454 (Ct. App. 1999))). 
There is no error in any event, for the First Amendment does not bar imposition of 
liability on Janssen for violating SCUTPA. Janssen relies on the false premise that 
its conduct was not unfair and deceptive.  While commercial speech is entitled to 
20 It is for the same reason we reject Janssen's claim that the trial court erred by 
excluding the testimony of the twenty surveyed physicians and evidence of the 
2007 Zyprexa product insert and 2010 Latuda product insert.    
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First Amendment protections, the Constitution does not erect a blanket shield 
insulating commercial speech from liability in all circumstances.  In this regard, we 
find Janssen's reliance on Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), is 
misplaced.  The Supreme Court of the United States held in Sorrell that "[s]peech 
in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."  Id. at 2659. Sorrell, however, does 
not deal with deceptive commercial speech.  Instead, the Sorrell Court invalidated 
a Vermont law that regulated the type of pharmacy records that a drug 
manufacturer could obtain and use in marketing prescription drugs.  Id. at 2659. 
The State of Vermont never argued "that the provision challenged . . . will prevent 
false or misleading speech," nor did it argue that the detailing21 at issue was "false 
or misleading within the meaning of [the Supreme] Court's First Amendment 
precedents."  Id. at 2672. We do not construe Sorrell as foreclosing a state from 
prohibiting unfair and deceptive prescription drug marketing. 
Indeed, it is a well-settled proposition that "[t]he government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial 
speech related to illegal activity."  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (internal citations omitted).  The 
State correctly notes that commercial speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment unless it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.  Johnson v. 
Collins Entm't Co., 349 S.C. 613, 624, 564 S.E.2d 653, 659 (2002).
Here, the jury found that Janssen's acts were unfair or deceptive, and thus unlawful 
under SCUTPA. In an action at law tried to a jury, the jury's factual findings will 
not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses that there is no evidence 
that reasonably supports the jury's findings. City of North Myrtle Beach v. E. 
Cherry Grove Realty Co., 397 S.C. 497, 502, 725 S.E.2d 676, 678 (2012).  The 
record is replete with evidence that reasonably supports a finding that Janssen's 
conduct was unfair and deceptive. Thus, we conclude Janssen may not avail itself 
21 Pharmaceutical companies such as Janssen "promote their drugs to doctors 
through a process called 'detailing.'  This often involves a scheduled visit to a 
doctor's office to persuade the doctor to prescribe a particular pharmaceutical.  
Detailers bring drug samples as well as medical studies that explain the 'details' 
and potential advantages of various prescription drugs."  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 
2659.
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of the protections of the First Amendment to shield itself from its deceptive 
conduct and false representations. 
F. 

Jury Instructions 

Janssen argues that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on federal law 
regarding "unfairness" and instead looking to South Carolina law to define the 
term.  We disagree and reject the premise that the jury charges on unfairness and 
the tendency to deceive standard are creations of state law; they are rooted in 
federal law. 
Modeled after the language of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),22 
SCUTPA declares unlawful any unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or 
commerce.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) ("Unfair methods of competition 
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."), with S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) 
("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.").  SCUTPA does 
not define the terms "unfair" and "deceptive"; rather, the legislature intended the 
courts to be guided by federal interpretations of those terms.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-
5-20(b) (1985) (instructing South Carolina courts to take guidance from "the 
interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to 
§ 5(a)(1)" of the FTCA). 
The trial court charged the jury: 
I'm gonna [sic] go back and read 39-5-20 to you one more time 
because this Code Section refers back to violations of that.  [Section] 
39-5-20, again, says unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 
Now, for an act to be a violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, the act or practice complained of must be unfair or 
deceptive. Now, whether an act or practice is unfair or deceptive, 
within the meaning of the act, depends upon the facts and 
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–77 (2012).
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circumstances surrounding what someone's done and the impact of 
that act or transaction on the market place. 
Now, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has committed, 
committed unfair trade practices.  A trade, practice, or act is an unfair 
trade, practice, or act if it offends established public policy or is
immoral, unethical, or oppressive.  This does not include act[s] or 
practices or representations that are nothing more than dealer talk, 
trade talk, or what is called puffing.
Even a truthful statement may be deceptive, under the Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, if it has a capacity or tendency to deceive when taken in 
the context of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement or the doing of the act. 
Further, a false or misleading act or practice is one which has the 
capacity or the tendency to deceive. There is no need to show that a 
representation was intended to deceive, but it must be shown that the 
act, the statement had the capacity or effect or the tendency to 
deceive. 
We find no reversible error in the trial court's failure to charge the precise verbiage 
of section 45(n) of the FTCA. We do not discern the wide chasm between the 
federal and state definitions of "unfair" that Janssen urges.  The FTC has issued 
"Policy Statements" that provide guidance on the statutory terms.  For example, in 
the Policy Statement on Deception, the FTC reviewed case law and Commission 
decisions and noted that "deception cases" may include representations or 
omissions in connection with the sale of a product "without adequate disclosures." 
Policy Statement on Deception, supra. FTC guidance further instructs that "there 
must be a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer" and that "the act or practice must be considered from the perspective of 
the reasonable consumer." Id. The FTC has additionally issued a Policy Statement 
on Unfairness, which acknowledged that the concept of "unfairness is one whose 
precise meaning is not immediately obvious."  Policy Statement on Unfairness, 
supra. FTC guidance provides the following general characteristics of an unfair 
practice claim: "(1) whether the practice injures consumers;23 (2) whether it 
23  As previously discussed, an Attorney General enforcement action does not 
require a showing of injury in fact. This is in accord with federal guidance.  See
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violates established public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous."  Id. 
The jury instruction was in substantial accord with the FTC guidance. Janssen 
makes the argument that there was no tendency to deceive (or likelihood of causing 
consumer injury) because the intended audience of its representations was the 
medical community, and further because the medical community knew or should 
have known the truth, Janssen must be absolved of any liability.  Janssen's 
argument is not without merit, for the context surrounding a practice or 
representation is a weighty consideration. See Policy Statement on Deception, 
supra ("[A] practice or representation directed to a well-educated group, such as 
prescription drug advertisement to doctors, would be judged in light of the 
knowledge and sophistication of that group.")  Janssen essentially seeks a 
categorical rule that insulates a pharmaceutical company from SCUTPA liability 
for misrepresentations made to prescribing physicians, a sophisticated group.  We 
decline to recognize such a rule.    
This "sophisticated audience" argument was vetted by the parties and charged to 
the jury in that the jury was required to assess the alleged unfair and deceptive 
practice in light of the "facts and circumstances surrounding what someone's done" 
and "in the context of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement 
or the doing of the act."24    Whether Janssen's actions and representations to the 
medical community constituted a violation of SCUTPA was a jury question.  The 
jury has spoken, and we are not permitted to weigh the evidence and invade the 
province of the jury. 
Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra (stating that practices that undermine free 
and informed consumer decisions undermine a well-functioning market and are 
properly banned as unfair practices under the FTCA). 
24  The charge is in accord with the law that "[w]hether an act or practice is unfair 
or deceptive within the meaning of the [SC]UTPA depends on the surrounding 
facts and the impact of the transaction on the marketplace." Wright v. Craft, 372 
S.C. 1, 26, 640 S.E.2d 486, 500 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing deBondt, 342 S.C. at 269, 
536 S.E.2d at 407)); see also Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra (noting that 
unwarranted or undisclosed health and safety risks may support a finding of 
unfairness). 
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In construing the charge as a whole, as we must, we conclude it properly defined 
an unfair trade practice in accordance with section 39-5-20(a) and (b).  See Proctor 
v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 368 S.C. 279, 310, 628 S.E.2d 496, 513 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (quoting Burroughs v. Worsham, 352 S.C. 382, 391, 574 S.E.2d 215, 
220 (Ct.App.2002)) ("'The substance of the law is what must be instructed to the 
jury, not any particular verbiage . . . .  A jury charge which is substantially correct 
and covers the law does not require reversal.'") (ellipsis in original); id. at 310, 628 
S.E.2d at 513 (citing Daves v. Cleary, 355 S.C. 216, 224, 584 S.E.2d 423, 427 
(Ct.App.2003)) ("When reviewing a jury charge for alleged error, the appellate 
court must consider the charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues 
presented at trial."). 
G. 

Regulated Activity Exception to SCUTPA 

Janssen claims that the State's labeling claim was barred by SCUTPA's regulated 
activity exemption.  We hold that Janssen has failed to preserve this issue for 
appellate review. However, even if we were to reach the merits, we would find 
that Janssen is not entitled to avail itself of the regulated activity exemption. 
SCUTPA expressly provides that it is inapplicable to "[a]ctions or transactions 
permitted under laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under 
statutory authority of this State or the United States."  S.C. Code § 39-5-40(a) 
(1985). "This exception exempts an entity from liability where its actions are 
lawful or where it does something required by law, or does something that would 
otherwise be a violation of the Act, but which is allowed under other statutes or 
regulations." Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs. Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 
123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009) (quotations omitted).  Janssen argues that, after 
approval of a proposed label, the FDA both authorized and required the use of that 
approved label.  Thus, Janssen argues that FDA approval of the label triggers 
SCUTPA's regulated activity exemption and prohibits any claim in connection 
with the sufficiency of the label. 
Initially, Janssen fails to identify any specific trial court rulings claimed to 
constitute error. Because of this, Janssen's argument does not sufficiently identify 
with particularity the alleged error, and Janssen has abandoned its claim on appeal.  
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See Rule 208(b)(4), SCACR ("The brief shall contain references to the transcript, 
pleadings, orders, exhibits, or other materials which may be properly included in 
the Record on Appeal . . . to support the salient facts alleged.  References shall also 
be made to where relevant objections and rulings occurred in the transcript."); see 
also First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) 
("Mere allegations of error are not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  
On appeal, the burden of showing abuse of discretion is on the party challenging 
the trial court's ruling." (citation omitted)). 
However, even if Janssen had properly preserved this issue, we note that Janssen 
was not entitled to avail itself of this SCUTPA provision.  Wyeth makes clear that 
"a central premise of federal drug regulation [is] that the manufacturer bears 
responsibility for the content of its label at all times."  555 U.S. at 570–71.  "[The 
manufacturer] is charged both with crafting an adequate label and with ensuring 
that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the market."  Id. at 571 
(citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b); 73 Fed. Reg. 49605).  Wyeth 
clearly rejects the notion that a manufacturer's decision not to include a stronger 
warning is authorized by the FDA—absent evidence that the FDA affirmatively 
considered and rejected the stronger warning after being supplied with an 
evaluation or analysis of the specific dangers presented.  Id. at 572–73. The very 
purpose of the "changes being effected" corollary to the FDCA authorizes 
manufacturers to strengthen the warnings on a label without FDA approval, as long 
as the manufacturer files a supplemental new drug application. Id. at 568; 21 
C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2013). Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court in Wyeth noted that "Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer 
protection against harmful products.  Congress did not provide a federal remedy 
for consumers harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the [FDCA].  Evidently, it 
determined that widely available state rights of action provided appropriate relief 
for injured consumers." Id. at 574. Accordingly, Janssen cannot shield itself from
liability by claiming that the FDA's approval of its label constituted an express 
authorization of its labeling decisions. See id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) ("[F]ederal law does not give drug manufacturers an unconditional right 
to market their federally approved drug at all times with the precise label initially 
approved by the FDA.").
H. 

Statute of Limitations 
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Janssen claims that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion for a directed 
verdict on the statute of limitations on the labeling claim and the DDL claim.  We 
disagree concerning the DDL claim and affirm, but agree in part with Janssen 
regarding the labeling claim.  The statute of limitations bars the labeling claim 
insofar as the trial court imposed civil penalties for violations that occurred more 
than three years prior to the parties' tolling agreement.  Because of the ongoing 
nature of Janssen's deceptive conduct, we affirm the judgment on the labeling 
claim but limit the imposition of civil penalties to a three-year period, coextensive 
with the statute of limitations, subject only to the additional period of time between 
the tolling agreement and the filing of the Complaint.     
At the close of all of the evidence, the State moved for a directed verdict as to 
Janssen's statute of limitations defense, arguing that Janssen failed to present any 
evidence that the Attorney General's office had actual or constructive notice of 
Janssen's unlawful conduct prior to the commencement of the three year statute of 
limitations.25  Specifically, the State argued there was no evidence that the 
Attorney General, more than three years prior to the commencement of the statute 
of limitations on January 24, 2004, knew or should have known about the 
deceptiveness of the DDL and the Risperdal label, the concealed studies, or the 
unlawful promotion of Risperdal in South Carolina.   
The trial court granted the State's motion for a directed verdict, finding that neither 
the DDL claim nor the labeling claim was barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations.  Specifically, the trial court noted that although the medical community 
was generally aware of the risks associated with Risperdal, some even as early as 
the mid-1990s, the point in time at which the side-effects of Risperdal became 
known was not the gravamen of the State's claims.  Rather, the specific conduct at 
issue was Janssen's false and misleading statements in the DDL and Janssen's 
failure to update its label to reflect the known degree of risks associated with 
Risperdal. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry was the point at which the State 
should have known that Janssen's conduct as to the DDL and the Risperdal label 
was unfair or deceptive and, thus, gave rise to a SCUTPA claim.   
25  The Complaint was filed on April 23, 2007, but, as noted, the State and Janssen 
entered into a tolling agreement concerning the statute of limitations on January 
24, 2007.
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As to the DDL claim, the trial court found that claim was not barred by the statute 
of limitations because there was no evidence that the false or misleading nature of 
the DDL could have been discovered before the DDMAC issued its warning letter 
to Janssen in April 2004, which was within the timeframe of the tolling agreement.  
As to the labeling claim, the trial court found that because Janssen took affirmative 
steps to prevent disclosure of unfavorable clinical trial results that revealed the 
serious degree of risks associated with Risperdal, the statute of limitations was 
equitably tolled during the period of time in which Janssen knew, but failed to 
disclose and shielded from public knowledge, the true degree of risks associated 
with Risperdal. The trial court found the labeling claim likewise was not barred by 
the statute of limitations, and awarded a civil penalty for each of the of 509,499 
Risperdal "sample boxes" distributed in South Carolina from 1998 through the date 
of the Complaint, April 23, 2007, each of which included the drug label in the 
sample packaging. 
Janssen argues this was error and that both claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations because the State had actual or constructive knowledge of the claims
before January 24, 2004. Specifically, as to the DDL claim, Janssen contends that 
the claim was discoverable from the face of the DDL itself, and therefore, the 
statute of limitations began to run at the time the DDL was mailed in November 
2003. As to the labeling claim, Janssen contends that claim is barred because the 
risks associated with Risperdal were widely known by the mid-1990s and that the 
alleged inadequacies in the labeling were apparent from the face of the label itself; 
therefore, Janssen posits that the labels themselves put the State on notice of its 
labeling claim as early as 1994, and that the three-year statute of limitations thus 
ran long before the State's Complaint was filed in 2007.  Janssen further argues the 
doctrine of equitable tolling should be sparingly applied and that there is no basis 
for applying it here.  
We first address the DDL claim.  SCUTPA provides for a three-year statute of 
limitations.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-150 (1985).  Under the discovery rule, the 
three-year clock starts ticking on the date the injured party either knows or should 
have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that a cause of action arises 
from wrongful conduct.  Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363, 468 S.E.2d 
645, 647 (1996) (citation omitted). We have carefully reviewed the record in light 
of the appropriate standard of review, and we agree with the trial court.  As a 
matter of law, the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence at trial 
was that the existence of a claim, i.e. the deceptive and unfair nature of Janssen's 
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conduct in disseminating the DDL, could not have reasonably been discovered 
prior to April 2004 when the FDA issued the Warning Letter to Janssen.26 See id.
at 366, 468 S.E.2d at 648 (finding that where the only reasonable conclusion 
supported by the evidence was that the lawsuit accrued on a particular date, there 
was no issue for the jury to decide and a directed verdict was proper).  We affirm
the trial court's finding that the DDL claim was timely.   
We turn to the labeling claim.  The procedural dilemma we confront is that the 
statute of limitations issue concerning the labeling claim was resolved at trial 
through principles of equitable tolling.  A determination in equity is not proper for 
a directed verdict motion insofar as determining what matters should be submitted 
to the jury.  It was therefore legal error to resolve the issue of equitable tolling 
pursuant to a directed verdict motion.  Under our de novo review of this equitable 
issue, we agree with Janssen that there is an insufficient basis for application of 
that doctrine to preserve the timeliness of all labeling violations, reaching back to 
the time Risperdal was first introduced in 1994.  See Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Servs. 
& Rehab. Ctr., 386 S.C. 108, 117, 687 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2009) (noting the doctrine of 
equitable tolling should be used sparingly and only when the interests of justice 
demand its use).  However, we do not view the error as one mandating reversal and 
a new trial, given the continuing nature of the accrual of labeling violations. 
Clearly, much of the labeling claim accrued more than three years prior to the 
January 24, 2007 tolling agreement.  The risks associated with atypical 
antipsychotics, like Risperdal, were becoming well known by the late 1990s.  The 
State's experts testified that the Risperdal label was inadequate as early as 1994 
when Janssen began marketing the drug.  By all accounts, in the early 2000s, 
evidence of the risks was pervasive.27  We find that the only reasonable conclusion 
supported by the evidence is that the Attorney General knew, or most assuredly 
26  Considerable argument is presented over whether the discovery rule should be 
analyzed through the person of the Attorney General or the typical approach of the 
reasonably prudent person. We need not decide the "relevant plaintiff" question 
and purported distinction between the two, for the result would be the same here.   
27  This underscores Janssen's point that the community of prescribing physicians 
should have known of the risks associated with Risperdal, and Janssen's resulting 
contention that the allegedly deceptive practices had little or no effect on the 
practice and frequency of prescribing Risperdal. 
41 

  
  
 
should have known, of potential SCUTPA violations regarding the Risperdal label 
prior to January 24, 2004.  Thus, the labeling violations occurring prior to January 
24, 2004, were therefore barred by the statute of limitations.  
Nevertheless, the labeling claim presents ongoing violations of SCUTPA that 
continued after January 24, 2004 and during the three-year-period prior to the 
tolling agreement. In requesting that the entire labeling claim be dismissed as time 
barred, Janssen assumes, wrongly so, that its ability to successfully invoke the 
statute of limitations to bar the labeling claim prior to January 24, 2004, ends the 
labeling claim altogether.  We reject Janssen's position, for Janssen misapprehends 
the statute of limitations and the concept of continuous accrual of this SCUTPA 
cause of action. The labeling claim presents a series of discrete, independently 
actionable wrongs that are at the core of the typical unfair trade practice action.  
The principles of this type of continuous accrual respond to
the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the statute of 
limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of 
misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent 
breach or misconduct; parties engaged in long-standing malfeasance 
would thereby obtain immunity in perpetuity from suit even for recent 
and ongoing malfeasance.  In addition, where misfeasance is ongoing, 
a defendant's claim to repose, the principal justification underlying the 
limitations defense, is vitiated.  . . . [Accordingly,] separate, recurring 
invasions of the same right can each trigger their own statute of 
limitations.  . . . Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies 
whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: [w]hen an 
obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action 
accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations 
period. 
Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 880 (Cal. 2013) (quotations and 
citations omitted) (distinguishing the continuous accrual doctrine from the 
continuing violation doctrine, which involves a single injury that is the product of a 
series of small harms, any one of which is not actionable on its own).  See Estate of 
Livingston v. Livingston, 404 S.C. 137, 147–48, 744 S.E.2d 203, 209 (Ct. App. 
2013) (finding a new statute of limitations begins to run after each separate injury, 
and therefore statute of limitations barred only claims falling outside the three-year 
time period and did not bar claims occurring within that time), cert. granted, No. 
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2013-001505 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 24, 2014); see also Hogar Dulce Hogar v. 
Cmty. Dev. Comm'n of Escondido, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 502 (Ct. App. 2003) 
("When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action 
accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period." 
(citation omitted)); cf. Anonymous Taxpayer v. S.C. Dep't of Rev., 377 S.C. 425, 
440–41, 661 S.E.2d 73, 81 (2008) (finding that, under the facts presented, the 
particular claim alleged by plaintiff constituted only one cause of action, and 
therefore, there was no continuing injury that would trigger a new limitations 
period).
Indeed, the language of SCUTPA itself contemplates that an unlawful method, act, 
or practice may result in multiple statutory violations, and it is the violations 
themselves that cause the statute of limitations to begin to run. S.C. Code Ann. § 
39-5-110(a) ("If a court finds that any person is willfully using or has willfully 
used a method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 39-5-20, the Attorney 
General . . . may recover on behalf of the State a civil penalty of not exceeding five 
thousand dollars per violation."  (emphasis added)).  We adopt the view that aligns 
with legislative intent as reflected in section 39-5-110, a common sense approach 
recognizing that the SCUTPA statute of limitations begins to run anew with each 
violation. Thus, where a claim involves a series of ongoing violations, recovery is 
limited to a period coextensive with the applicable statute of limitations.  
In sum, we agree with the State regarding the DDL claim, for we find that claim, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have been discovered no earlier than 
April 2004 when the FDA issued its warning letter to Janssen.  However, we agree 
with Janssen concerning the labeling claim insofar as civil penalties were awarded 
for violations occurring from 1998 until January 24, 2004 (three years prior to the 
tolling agreement). Under these facts, it was error to award the State civil penalties 
for violations in connection with the labeling claim outside the statute of 
limitations.  An award for civil penalties within the statute of limitations was 
proper.
I. 

Preemption 

Janssen argues that both the labeling claim and the DDL claim are preempted by 
federal law. Specifically, Janssen argues the labeling claim is barred by implied 
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conflict preemption and that the DDL claim is barred by the express preemption 
provision of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006).  We disagree. 
When "Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,' we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.'" Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) 
(quotations and citations omitted) (ellipses in original). 
"In 1962, Congress amended the FDCA and shifted the burden of proof from the 
FDA to the manufacturer." Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567. "Before 1962, the [FDA] had 
to prove harm to keep a drug out of the market, but the amendments required the 
manufacturer to demonstrate that its drug was safe for use under the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling before it could 
distribute the drug."  Id. (quotations and citations omitted). "In addition, the 
amendments required the manufacturer to prove the drug's effectiveness by 
introducing substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).  "As 
[Congress] enlarged the FDA's powers to protect the public health and assure the 
safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, Congress took care to preserve state 
law." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).  "The 1962 amendments [to the 
FDCA] added a saving clause, indicating that a provision of state law would only 
be invalidated upon a direct and positive conflict with the FDCA."  Id. (quotations 
and citations omitted).  "Consistent with that provision, state common-law suits 
'continued unabated despite . . . FDA regulation.'"  Id. (quoting Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).28 
Based upon Wyeth, we find that the State's DDL claim is not expressly preempted 
by federal law. Additionally, we find that Janssen has not preserved their implied 
conflict preemption claim for appellate review.  Even assuming Janssen's argument 
regarding implied preemption is not procedurally barred, however, we find it to be 
without merit. 
1. 
28  The FDA did not have the authority to mandate a manufacturer change its label 
until amendments to the FDCA in 2007.  21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (Supp. V 2011).
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Express Preemption of the DDL Claim
Janssen argues that the State's claim regarding the DDL relies on a single piece of 
evidence—the April 2004 DDMAC warning letter characterizing Janssen's DDL as 
"false and misleading."  As such, Janssen asserts the DDL claim is based solely on 
a violation of the FDCA, which provides no private right of action.  Janssen thus 
concludes that this "federal claim" is preempted and may not be maintained.  
Because Janssen's argument is based on a false premise, we disagree. 
It is true that the State pursued a SCUTPA claim based on the November 2003 
DDL. It is also true that the State introduced the April 2004 DDMAC warning 
letter as evidence in support of its DDL claim.  It is not true that the sole evidence 
establishing the false and misleading nature of the DDL comes from the 
subsequent April 2004 DDMAC warning letter.  Janssen not only views the DDL 
claim myopically, but conflates the concepts of evidence and claims.  There was 
substantial additional evidence relating to the deception surrounding the November 
2003 DDL, much of which is noted above.  For example, the State presented 
evidence that, scientific proof to the contrary, Janssen's Risperdal sales strategy 
specifically sought to differentiate Risperdal from competing drugs by 
emphasizing that Risperdal caused less weight gain relative to other atypical 
antipsychotics such as Zyprexa. 
Moreover, the State presented internal emails between Janssen executives, one of 
which included discussion of Janssen's desire to gain market share over 
competitors by avoiding being subjected to a class labeling requirement as to 
diabetes/hyperglycemia.  Yet another email indicated that at least one Janssen 
scientist supported glucose screening and monitoring for Risperdal patients, but 
that such a position was "not the company line."  Janssen's broad, aggressive, and 
deceptive marketing strategy resulted in the discrete DDL claim.  In short, the 
record is replete with evidence beyond the 2004 DDMAC warning letter to support 
the State's DDL claim.  Further, at the end of trial, the jury was charged with 
determining several factual issues, each of which was based solely on the 
provisions of SCUTPA, and the trial judge assessed penalties under SCUTPA 
framework. Accordingly, we find that the State's SCUTPA claim concerning the 
DDL is not preempted by the FDCA. 
2. 

Implied Conflict Preemption of the Labeling Claim 
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Janssen argues that the State's labeling claim is barred by implied conflict 
preemption.  Janssen failed to raise the doctrine of implied conflict preemption in 
its motion for summary judgment or its initial directed verdict motion at the close 
of the State's case-in-chief. Accordingly, this argument was waived because it was 
not asserted in Janssen's initial motion for directed verdict.29 See Freeman v. A. &
M. Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 293 S.C. 255, 258–59, 359 S.E.2d 532, 535 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
Additionally, Janssen's argument on appeal is substantively different than the 
argument below. Before the trial court, Janssen moved for a directed verdict, 
arguing that the Wyeth "exception to preemption" did not apply since the State 
failed to establish that Janssen could have, and should have, updated the Risperdal 
label without prior FDA approval.  Given this purported failure of proof, Janssen 
argued that the State's labeling claim was preempted.  The trial court rejected 
Janssen's argument and found that Wyeth was controlling. In contrast, Janssen now 
argues that the State's SCUTPA claims sought to impose labeling requirements 
different from those required by the FDA, and thus, according to Janssen, the 
doctrine of implied conflict preemption bars the State's claims.  This argument, 
however, is not preserved for appellate review.  See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 
S.E.2d at 694 ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground 
on appeal." (citing Prioleau, 345 S.C. at 411, 548 S.E.2d at 216; Benton, 338 S.C. 
at 157, 526 S.E.2d at 231)).
Nonetheless, even were we to find Janssen's argument not to be procedurally 
barred, we would find it is without merit.  Janssen suggests that the State sought to
impose labeling requirements different than those imposed by the FDA.  The 
State's claim, however, did not seek to penalize Janssen for distributing its FDA-
approved label. Rather, the State sought civil penalties based on Janssen's actions 
29 Notably, Janssen did raise express preemption as to the DDL in its initial 
directed verdict motion.  However, counsel for Janssen candidly acknowledged in 
its renewed directed verdict motion at the close of the evidence, "[W]e have an 
argument that hasn't been made by us before, and that is that the package insert 
claim, the claim dealing with the label, is preempted by federal law."  Further, 
counsel for Janssen stated, "We're arguing something quite different that we 
haven't argued before.  We haven't [previously] argued about Wyeth against 
Levine." 
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in failing to discharge its ongoing, affirmative duty to keep its label updated and 
ensure "that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the market."  
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b); 73 
Fed. Reg. 49605). 
Further, we reject Janssen's argument that Wyeth is inapposite because this case 
involves an enforcement action by the Attorney General on behalf of the State.  
Regardless of whether a state-law enforcement action is brought by a private 
individual or an attorney general on behalf of a state, Wyeth makes clear that 
federal labeling standards are "a floor upon which States could build" and noted 
the FDA's agency position that, "in establishing minimal standards for drug labels, 
it did not intend to preclude the states from imposing additional labeling 
requirements." Id. at 577–78 (quotations omitted). Rather, "[f]ailure-to-warn 
actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the 
FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times."  Id. at 579. 
Indeed, "federal law does not give drug manufacturers an unconditional right to 
market their federally approved drug at all times with the precise label initially 
approved by the FDA." Id. at 583 (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment).  
Janssen's claim is without merit. 
Having affirmed the trial court concerning Janssen's liability in connection with 
both the labeling claim and the DDL claim, we turn now to the penalty award.30 
30 Janssen raises a number of other issues, each of which we have carefully 
reviewed and find to be without merit or unpreserved.  We affirm based upon Rule 
220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Fields v. J. Haynes Waters 
Builders, Inc., 376 S.C. 545, 557, 658 S.E.2d 80, 86 (2008) (holding that in order 
to warrant reversal, the appealing party must show both the error of the ruling and 
resulting prejudice) (citing Fields v. Reg. Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 26, 
609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005)); Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 655, 615 
S.E.2d 440, 449 (2005) (finding the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection at 
trial waives the right to complain about an issue on appeal) (citing Taylor v. 
Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 214 n.9, 479 S.E.2d 35, 42 n.9 (1996)); Futch v. 
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (noting that an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 
disposition of prior issues is dispositive) (citing Whiteside v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. No. One, 311 S.C. 335, 340, 428 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1993)); Wilder Corp. v. 
Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n objection must be 
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III. 

Penalty Award 

SCUTPA allows the Attorney General to recover on behalf of the State a civil 
penalty of up to $5,000 per violation.  S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-110(a). 
Undoubtedly, Janssen's deceptive conduct relating to Risperdal warrants a civil 
penalty, and because the civil penalty award under section 39-5-110(a) is within 
the discretion of the trial court, we review the trial court's penalty award under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., Inc., 280 S.C. 
519, 528, 313 S.E.2d 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The party challenging a 
discretionary ruling of the trial court has the burden of showing a clear abuse of 
discretion."); accord Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Cole, 740 S.E.2d 562, 566 
(W.Va. 2013) (holding a trial court's award of civil penalties pursuant to state 
statute will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears the trial court 
abused its discretion). 
The State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the distribution of each sample 
box containing the deceptive labeling, each DDL, and each follow-up sales call to 
the DDL by a Janssen representative constituted a separate SCUTPA violation.  
The trial court adopted a multi-factor test used by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in determining an appropriate civil penalty: "(1) the 
good or bad faith of the defendants; (2) the injury to the public; (3) the defendant's
ability to pay; (4) the desire to eliminate the benefits derived by a violation; and (5) 
the necessity of vindicating the authority of [the regulatory agency]."  United 
sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the point being urged by the 
objector." (citation omitted)); Talley v. South Carolina Higher Educ. Tuition 
Grants Comm., 289 S.C. 483, 487, 347 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1986) ("It is an axiomatic 
rule of law that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal." (citing Am. 
Hardware Supply Co. v. Whitmire, 278 S.C. 607, 609, 300 S.E.2d 289, 290 
(1983))); Eaddy v. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 355 S.C. 154, 164, 584 S.E.2d 
390, 396 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without 
supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not preserved 
for our review." (citing Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 
557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001))).
48 

   
 
 
                                        
 
 
 
States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir. 1981).31 
Janssen challenges the penalty award on numerous grounds, including the 
argument that the total penalty, in excess of $327,000,000, is excessive.  We agree 
with Janssen in part. There are certain factors common to the labeling and DDL 
claims. First, Janssen's deceit was substantial.  In order to maintain its market 
share, Janssen's furtive efforts to mislead prescribing physicians about the risks and 
side effects associated with Risperdal were reprehensible and in callous disregard 
for the health and welfare of the public.  Janssen's desire for market share and 
increased sales32 knew no bounds, leading to its egregious violation of South 
Carolina law, particularly in connection with the DDL.  Janssen's conduct is 
irrefutably linked to its longstanding efforts to conceal the truth regarding 
Risperdal. This corrupt corporate culture through the years was a factor, and 
understandably so, in the trial court's imposition of such a substantial penalty.   
We agree in part with Janssen that its conduct likely had little impact on the 
community of prescribing physicians.  The truth about the risks associated with 
atypical antipsychotics was well known, particularly in the pharmaceutical 
industry. This begs the question of why Janssen would go to such lengths to 
perpetuate and defend a lie.  Whatever the answer, the point remains that Janssen 
31  Application of the Reader's Digest factors was proper here. Given that this is 
our first opportunity to address the appropriate factors for assessing a civil penalty 
in an Attorney General directed claim under SCUTPA, we direct that, 
prospectively, the following list of non-exclusive factors be used in assessing civil 
penalties under SCUTPA: (1) the degree of culpability and good or bad faith of the 
defendant; (2) the duration of the defendant's unlawful conduct; (3) active 
concealment of information by the defendant; (4) defendant's awareness of the 
unfair or deceptive nature of their conduct; (5) prior similar conduct by the 
defendant; (6) the defendant's ability to pay; (7) the deterrence value of the 
assessed penalties; and (8) the actual impact or injury to the public resulting from
defendant's unlawful conduct.  We further authorize our able trial judges to 
consider any other factors they deem appropriate under the circumstances.  In 
issuing a ruling, the trial court should make sufficient findings of fact concerning 
all relevant factors to enable appellate review.  
32 Since 1994, Risperdal sales approximated $30 billion. 
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did go to such lengths. Yet, the absence of significant actual harm resulting from
Janssen's deceptive conduct leads us to conclude the trial court erred in part in its 
penalty assessment. 
A. 

Violations and Reduced Civil Penalty 

1. 

Labeling Claim 

The trial court assessed a $300 civil penalty against Janssen for each Risperdal 
"sample box" distributed to South Carolina prescribers from 1998 through the date 
of the Complaint, April 23, 2007, for a total of 509,499 violations.  As discussed, 
we reverse the civil penalties awarded for conduct that occurred prior to January 
24, 2004, for that part of the State's labeling claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations.  Based on the record, during the period of time from February 2004 
until the filing of the Complaint in April 2007, Janssen made 20,575 visits to 
prescribing physicians in South Carolina and distributed 228,447 sample boxes 
containing deceptive labeling. 
Janssen challenges the penalty award of $300 per sample box on numerous 
grounds, including the argument that the penalty is excessive. We agree and find 
the $300 penalty per sample box excessive.  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances and consideration of the Reader's Digest factors, we remit the 
penalty to $100 per sample box, for a civil penalty of $22,844,700.
2. 

DDL Claim 

Janssen mailed 7,184 DDLs to South Carolina physicians in November 2003.  The 
trial court considered each letter a separate violation and imposed a penalty of 
$4,000 per letter, for a penalty of $28,736,000.  In addition, the trial court counted 
each follow-up sales call to the DDL by a Janssen representative as a separate 
violation. There were 36,372 follow-up sales calls.  The trial court again assessed 
a penalty of $4,000 for each sales call, for a penalty of $145,488,000.   
Janssen challenges the penalty award on numerous grounds, including 
excessiveness. While the question presented is close, we cannot say that the trial 
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court abused its discretion in assessing the $28,736,000 penalty associated with the 
7,184 DDLs. A $4,000 penalty per each DDL is indeed substantial.  But Janssen's 
deceit, as described above, was also substantial.  The DDL was especially 
egregious, for it represented not mere nondisclosure but a corporately sanctioned 
decision to affirmatively lie and an attempt to mislead the medical community.  
We affirm the civil penalty of $28,736,000 penalty associated with the 7,184 
DDLs. 
Janssen's misconduct in the more than 36,000 follow-up visits may be similarly 
viewed, for the follow-up visits were designed to continue the false DDL narrative.  
Nevertheless, a penalty of $4,000 per follow-up visit is excessive as a matter of 
law under the circumstances. We find in most instances, these were follow-up 
calls to the same prescribing physicians who received the DDL in the mail.  In fact, 
in many instances there were multiple calls to the same physicians. We remit the 
penalty to $2,000 per follow-up sales call, for a penalty of $72,744,000.  When 
combined with the penalty for the DDL mailing, the total penalty assessed against 
Janssen for the DDL claim is $101,480,000. 
The combined civil penalty for the labeling and DDL claims is $124,324,700.  
B. 

Constitutionality of the Penalty Award 

Janssen also raises a number of constitutional challenges to the trial court's penalty 
order. First, Janssen claims that the $327 million penalty violates the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution.  Second, Janssen claims that the 
penalty award violates due process because it is grossly excessive.  We analyze 
this argument on the basis of the remitted penalty of approximately $124 million. 
We find no constitutional violation.
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause [of 
the U.S. Constitution] is the principle of proportionality:  The amount of the 
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is 
designed to punish." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998); see 
also Medlock v. One 1985 Jeep Cherokee VIN 1JCWB7828FT129001, 322 S.C. 
127, 132, 470 S.E.2d 373, 377 (1996) (adopting the federal "instrumentality" 
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standard in the context of civil forfeitures for purposes of South Carolina's 
"excessive fines" analysis). The Court will only find a violation of the Excessive 
Fines Clause if the penalty is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of a 
defendant's offense." Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).  "The Ninth 
Circuit and other federal courts have consistently found that civil penalty awards in 
which the amount of the award is less than the statutory maximum do not run afoul 
of the Excessive Fines Clause." United States v. Mackby, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing cases from the First Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and D.C. 
Circuit). This is so because legislative pronouncements regarding the proper range 
of fines "represent the collective opinion of the American people as to what is and 
is not excessive. Given that excessiveness is a highly subjective judgment, the 
courts should be hesitant to substitute their opinion for that of the people."  United 
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 
1999) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336). 
We find that the penalty in this case, now substantially reduced, bears a rational 
relationship to the gravity of Janssen's conduct in perpetuating a marketing scheme 
in South Carolina designed to be unfair and deceptive under our law.  Furthermore, 
the penalty awards per violation are within the range set by the legislature in 
enacting SCUTPA. Accordingly, the penalty award is not grossly disproportionate 
to Janssen's pattern of unfair and deceptive behavior, and, thus, we hold that the 
award does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the South Carolina or the 
United States Constitution. We turn now to Janssen's due process argument. 
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution "places a limitation upon the 
power of the states to prescribe penalties for violations of their laws."  St. Louis, 
Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919). States, however, "still 
possess a wide latitude of discretion in the matter, and . . . their enactments 
transcend the limitation only where the penalty prescribed is so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously 
unreasonable." Id. at 66–67 (citations omitted); see also Shipman v. Du Pre, 222 
S.C. 475, 480, 73 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1952) (embracing the Williams standard). 
Given the evidence that demonstrates Janssen's pattern of unfair and deceptive 
behavior, we find that the penalties in this case are not violative of the Due Process 
Clause. We decline to set forth a bright-line rule or ratio to delineate what level of 
penalties are appropriate, instead undertaking a case-by-case determination based 
on the severity of the underlying conduct.  While the penalty award against Janssen 
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is quite large, the penalty must be analyzed in context in view of the clear 
legislative intent of SCUTPA to deter unfair and deceptive behavior in the conduct 
of trade and commerce in South Carolina.  When all factors are considered, we 
find that the penalty award does not violate the Due Process Clause.33 
And finally, we comment on the amicus curiae brief filed by the South Carolina 
Chamber of Commerce.  The Chamber seeks clarity from this Court to provide a 
predictable and favorable business climate in this state.  The Chamber is especially 
distressed by the $327 million penalty, which it views as excessive and as "overt 
hostility toward business." While we agree the penalty awarded by the trial court 
was excessive, the Chamber's additional concerns are based on a series of false 
premises.  The Chamber posits that Janssen's conduct is being "judged according to 
subjective, intangible standards."  More to the point, the implication is that South 
Carolina stands alone in arbitrarily singling-out Janssen for what amounts to 
nothing more than an aggressive marketing strategy.  That is simply not the case.  
Because of its deceptive conduct in the marketing of Risperdal, Janssen has been 
the subject of litigation throughout the country.  Indeed, the deceptive marketing 
that gave rise to this action also formed the basis of federal civil and criminal 
claims against Janssen and its parent company for, among other things, making 
"false statements about the safety and efficacy of Risperdal."  The federal litigation 
has thus far resulted in agreed upon penalties in excess of $2 billion.  When viewed 
objectively based on the jury verdict, Janssen over the course of many years 
consciously engaged in lies and deception in the marketing of Risperdal.  Thus, the 
suggestion that the Attorney General of South Carolina stands alone in pursuing 
amorphous and subjective claims against Janssen is without merit.  Moreover, the 
argument that today's decision will impermissibly chill business in South Carolina 
must likewise be rejected.  See FTC v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 940 
33  While Janssen's parent company has paid more than $2 billion to settle 
Risperdal related federal litigation, there have been a number of state court actions.  
In submitting supplemental authority to the Court concerning the amount of the 
penalty, Janssen notes that the "Arkansas matter" was settled "for $7.75 million" 
and "an average of $4.89 million settlement per state [was] reached in the multi-
state settlement announced by the Texas Attorney General."  We have considered 
Janssen's understandable settlement of many state court claims, but we decline to 
rely on average settlements as dispositive, especially when we are constrained by 
an abuse of discretion standard of review.  
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(N.D. Ill. 2008) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–482 
(1974)) ("If the FTC were to prevail at trial, all that would be 'chilled' would be 
unfair and deceptive practices—a result consistent with the principle that '[t]he
necessity of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the 
commercial world.'"); id. (citing FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934)) 
("Fair competition is not attained by balancing a gain in money against a 
misrepresentation of the thing supplied.  The courts must set their faces against a 
conception of business standards so corrupting in its tendency."); FTC v. Standard 
Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[The FTC's] duty . . . is to discover 
and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience 
of the community may progressively develop."), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 
112 (1937) (reversing that part of the Second Circuit's holding which modified and 
weakened the FTC's cease and desist order).  Surely the Chamber desires a legal 
system that honors the rule of law and one which does not insulate businesses from
liability for unfair and deceptive practices.   
Our decision today is faithful to objective legal principles, legislative intent in 
SCUTPA and the rule of law.  Moreover, we have set forth clear guidance for the 
business community, the Bench and the Bar for determining what conduct is 
actionable under SCUTPA and what factors bear on the determination of an 
appropriate penalty—precisely the type of clarity the Chamber seeks. 
IV. 

Conclusion 

Based on the statute of limitations, we reverse the judgment on labeling claim to 
the extent the trial court awarded civil penalties for conduct prior to January 24, 
2004. We otherwise affirm as modified the judgment on the labeling claim and 
remit the civil penalty to $22,844,700.  We affirm the liability judgment on the 
DDL claim, but remit those civil penalties to $101,480,000.  We remand to the trial 
court for entry of judgment in the amount of $124,324,700.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., dissenting 
in a separate opinion. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES: With great respect for the majority's thorough treatment 
of these complex issues, I dissent from those portions of its opinion addressing: (1) 
the timeliness of the labeling claim; and (2) the reduction of the DDL penalty 
award. 
I. Statute of Limitations
I agree the Attorney General knew or should have known prior to January 24, 2004 
that he may have had a SCUTPA claim against Janssen based, in part, on research 
indicating Janssen's Risperdal label misled consumers insofar as it failed to 
disclose the drug's side effects.  See Kreutner v. David, 320 S.C. 283, 285–86, 465 
S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995) (discussing the discovery rule for purposes of triggering the 
limitations period and finding that where the evidence is overwhelming a 
reasonable person should have known she might have a claim at a time beyond the 
statute of limitations, then such claim is time-barred).  I therefore agree with the 
majority's conclusion that the Attorney General's SCUTPA claim for labeling 
violations occurring before January 24, 2004 was time-barred, and that the trial 
judge erred in holding equitable tolling removed the bar. 
My disagreement is with the majority's application of the continuous accrual 
doctrine. I would not apply the doctrine in this appeal because doing so does not 
affirm the statute of limitations ruling to the extent the trial judge found the pre-
January 24, 2004 labeling claim timely and permitted that claim to go to the jury.  
In my opinion, we may invoke our authority to affirm on any ground appearing in 
the record only when the result is to affirm the trial judge's ruling in toto.  See Rule 
220(c), SCACR. Here, the effect of applying the continuous accrual doctrine is 
only a partial affirmance.  Further, we have no way of knowing whether the jury's
liability determination was based on conduct outside the limitations period since 
we cannot know whether this jury would have found a SCUTPA violation had it 
considered only Janssen's labeling conduct after January 24, 2004.  I do not agree 
that reducing the amount of the penalty for the labeling claim cures the prejudice to 
Janssen given the unreliability of the jury's liability determination.  Thus, I 
respectfully submit we should not apply the continuous accrual doctrine34 in this 
appeal as doing so prejudices Janssen. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the jury's finding of liability because the labeling 
34 I leave for another day whether we should adopt this doctrine in the context of 
SCUTPA or other statutory claims. 
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claim is barred by the statute of limitations.  I would also reverse the trial judge's
labeling claim penalty because the claim is untimely.
DDL Penalty Award
As for the reduction of the DDL penalty award, I would find the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in awarding $174,224,000 based on Janssen mailing 7,184 
deceptive DDLs and following up with 36,372 sales calls to sanction the deception 
already perpetrated. See State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 528, 
313 S.E.2d 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1984) (reviewing the award of civil penalties under 
an abuse of discretion standard). As for Janssen's contention that the follow-up 
sales calls were made to the same prescribing physicians who had already received 
the DDL, I would find the trial judge properly considered this argument and 
exercised his discretion in finding Janssen's culpability (Reader's Digest35 Factor 2) 
outweighed the actual impact or injury resulting from Janssen's unlawful conduct 
(Reader's Digest Factor 8). 
Ultimately, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate Janssen's conduct, 
the degree of culpability, the duration of Janssen's conduct, Janssen's active 
concealment of Risperdal's side effects to South Carolina health care providers, 
Janssen's awareness of its deceptive conduct, Janssen's ability to pay, and the 
actual impact, if any, resulting from Janssen's deceptive conduct.  See Reader's 
Digest Ass'n, 662 F.2d at 967. Based on the trial judge's articulation of the 
Reader's Digest factors and his proper consideration of those factors, I would find 
Janssen has not shown the court abused its discretion in awarding a $174,224,000 
civil penalty for the DDL claim, an amount within the limits set forth in SCUTPA.  
See Wallace v. Timmons, 237 S.C. 411, 421, 117 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1960) (stating 
that in reviewing a trial judge's decision under an abuse of discretion standard, this 
Court may not substitute its judgment simply because it might have reached a 
different conclusion had it been in the trial judge's place).  Therefore, I would 
affirm the trial judge's penalty award of $174,224,000 as to the DDL claim. 
35 United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(outlining the multi-factor analysis to determine the propriety of a statutory 
penalty, which the trial judge applied, the majority has adopted, and with which I 
concur). 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of James R. Jones, II, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000535 
Opinion No. 27544 

Submitted June 16, 2015 – Filed July 8, 2015 

DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 
Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Desa Ballard, of Ballard & Watson, of West Columbia, 
for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of any sanction in Rule 7(b), RLDE.  He requests that the sanction 
be imposed retroactively to November 27, 2007, the date of his interim suspension.  
In the Matter of Jones, 375 S.C. 493, 654 S.E.2d 271 (2007).  Respondent further 
agrees to enter into a restitution plan with the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the 
Commission) to repay persons and entities harmed as a result of his misconduct.  
Finally, in the event he is reinstated to the practice of law, respondent agrees to 
complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account 
School with twelve (12) months of the date of his reinstatement.  We accept the 
Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of law in this state, not 
retroactively to the date of his interim suspension.  Further, within thirty (30) days 
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of the date of this order, respondent shall enter into a restitution plan with the 
Commission to pay restitution as directed hereafter in this opinion.  Finally, in the 
event he is reinstated to the practice of law, respondent shall complete the Legal 
Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account School no later than 
twelve (12) months from the date of his reinstatement.  The facts, as set forth in the 
Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
Matter I 
On March 29, 2007, respondent took possession of $1,400,000 for Complainant A 
from the sale of property in Horry County.  Respondent agreed to hold the 
proceeds from the transaction in trust on behalf of Bogey Exchange Company, 
Inc., which was created by respondent to act as a Qualified Intermediary.   
In June 2007, respondent issued a check from the Bogey Exchange Company trust 
account to Complainant A's sister that was returned for insufficient funds.  Within 
approximately fourteen (14) days, respondent made the check good. After June 
2007, respondent failed to return repeated messages from Complainant A regarding 
the monies in the trust account.    
On November 7, 2007, respondent issued two checks for $158,721.58 and 
$135,000 from the Bogey Exchange Company trust account made payable to 
Complainant A.  Before depositing the checks, Complainant A was able to verify 
with the bank that there were insufficient funds in the Bogey Exchange Company 
account to cover the checks.  Respondent admitted to Complainant A that he could 
not account for the missing funds that he was holding in trust. 
Matter II 
In May 2005, respondent took possession of monies belonging to Complainant B 
and agreed to hold the monies in trust.  Respondent placed the monies into a trust 
account styled as "Complainant B Trust."  The Complainant B Trust held 
$1,300,000 at the time respondent created the trust.  
On November 28, 2007, respondent closed the account.  Respondent failed to 
return several calls from Complainant B seeking information relating to the 
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monies, as well as copies of bank statements and other financial information 
relating to the Trust. Respondent admits he cannot account for the missing funds 
placed in Complainant B's Trust. 
Matter III 
At some point after the death of Jane Doe in June 2005, respondent was appointed 
as co-personal representative with James S. Pope, Esquire.  An agreement was 
reached between respondent and Mr. Pope that respondent would handle the legal 
and tax work for the Estate of Jane Doe.   
In January 2007, respondent took possession of two checks in the total amount of 
$13,002.00 from a payor on behalf of the Estate of Jane Doe.  Respondent opened 
an estate account with a bank shortly after receiving the two checks and deposited 
the entire amount into the account.  Respondent admits he cannot account for the 
Estate of Jane Doe's funds.   
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall 
provide prompt communication to client and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information); Rule 1.5 (lawyer shall not charge or collect unreasonable 
fee or amount for expenses); and Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall safekeep client funds; 
lawyer shall promptly deliver to client or third person any funds or other property 
that client or third person entitled to receive; upon request by client, lawyer shall 
promptly render full accounting regarding client's funds).  Respondent further 
admits he has violated the provisions of Rule 417, SCACR.   
Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct).  
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from
the practice of law in this state. The disbarment shall not be made retroactive to 
the date of respondent's interim suspension.  Within thirty (30) days of the date of 
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this order, respondent shall enter into a restitution plan with the Commission to pay 
restitution to the following persons and entity:  Complainant A - $1,400,000; 
Complainant B - $1,300,000; and the Estate of Jane Doe - $13,002.  Payments may 
be offset by any amount paid by respondent's malpractice carrier and the Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection (Lawyers' Fund) and any amounts previously paid by 
respondent. Respondent shall fully reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for all claims
paid on his behalf as required by Rule 411(c)(2), SCACR, prior to his 
reinstatement to the practice of law. In the event he is reinstated to the practice of 
law, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics 
School and Trust Account School no later than twelve (12) months from the date 
of his reinstatement. Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, 
respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has 
complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his 
Certificate of Admission to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 
v. 
Christopher Broadnax, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-000615 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Richland County 
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27545 

Heard February 4, 2015 – Filed July 8, 2015 

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney and Assistant 

Attorney General Mary Shannon Williams, all of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: The State of South Carolina appeals the court of 
appeals' decision reversing Christopher Broadnax's (Respondent) convictions for 
armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial.  We reverse in part 
and affirm in part the decision of the court of appeals.     
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At 5:30 p.m. on May 24, 2009, a masked gunman entered Church's Chicken 
on Two Notch Road in Columbia.  He held one of the employees at gunpoint while 
the employee emptied the cash registers.  Three other employees locked 
themselves in the kitchen.  The gunman was wearing a striped shirt, had a 
distinctive "lazy eye," and carried a clear plastic bag. 
After the employee filled the bag with money from the registers, the gunman 
calmly exited the store, climbed into a "gray Dodge old model truck" driven by an 
accomplice, and left the scene.  One of the employees chased the gunman outside 
and saw him riding in the passenger seat of the gray truck as the driver pulled out 
of the parking lot onto Two Notch Road.   
Police responded to the scene within approximately three minutes, and based 
on the employees' descriptions of the getaway vehicle, stopped the driver a short 
distance from the Church's Chicken on Two Notch Road.1  When officers 
approached the vehicle, they found Respondent crouched down on the floorboard 
of the passenger side. Officers immediately noticed that Respondent had a "lazy 
eye." The police officers found a gun and a bag full of money (matching the 
employees' descriptions) jammed under the truck's passenger seat, adjacent to 
Respondent. Further, one of the employees identified Respondent as the gunman 
in a "show-up" identification, and testified that he recognized Respondent's
distinctive facial features, build, and clothing.2 
1 A testifying officer stated that the truck was distinctive because it was in poor 
condition and "had a number of dents and pings and so forth."  
2 Several of the employees also made in-court identifications of Respondent as the 
perpetrator of the crimes. Furthermore, Respondent's accomplice testified against 
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Respondent was charged with one count of armed robbery and four counts 
of kidnapping. 
After the State rested, Respondent indicated that he would testify in his own 
defense. Consequently, the State moved to admit Respondent's prior criminal 
record for purposes of impeachment. The trial court heard arguments and 
conducted an inquiry into which of Respondent's prior convictions should be 
admitted.  Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE, and the court of appeals' opinion in 
State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the trial court 
admitted three of Respondent's four prior armed robbery convictions.3 
During his testimony, Respondent denied any involvement in the robbery.  
However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding Respondent's prior 
convictions for armed robbery.4  The State likewise questioned Respondent about 
his prior convictions.  
The trial judge then instructed the jury:
You've heard evidence that the defendant was convicted of a crime 
other than the one for which the defendant is now on trial. This 
evidence may be considered by you if you can conclude it is true only 
in deciding whether the defendant's testimony is believable and for no 
other purpose. You must not consider the defendant's prior record as 
any evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge that we are trying 
here today. 
The jury found Respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of 
kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced Respondent to a mandatory minimum
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on 
him at trial.   

3 The trial court also admitted Respondent's prior convictions for transaction card 

theft, grand larceny, and petit larceny. 

4 The trial court permitted Respondent's counsel to elicit the prior conviction 

testimony during his direct examination without waiving his objection to the 

admission of that testimony. 
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Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions.  
On appeal to the court of appeals, Respondent argued, inter alia, that the 
trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment 
purposes. See State v. Broadnax, 401 S.C. 238, 241, 736 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ct. 
App. 2013). The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court 
for a new trial. Id.  Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) Respondent's prior 
armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, 
and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to 
admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and 
(2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 244–48, 736 
S.E.2d at 691–93.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that Respondent's
prior armed robbery convictions were not crimes of dishonesty, 
and were therefore inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE? 
II.	 Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to find any error 
in the admission of Respondent's prior criminal record harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.  State 
v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  The admission or 
exclusion of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not 
be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 
557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) (citation omitted); see also State v. Kelly, 319 S.C. 
173, 176, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) ("A trial judge has considerable latitude in 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his rulings will not be disturbed absent 
a showing of probable prejudice." (citation omitted)).  "An abuse of discretion 
occurs where the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or 
are controlled by an error of law." State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 
S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000) (citation omitted).  
LAW/ANALYSIS
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I. Prior Armed Robbery Convictions 
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court 
because armed robbery is a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is 
automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE.  We disagree. 
Rule 609(a), SCRE, provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,  
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
In State v. Al-Amin, the court of appeals considered the question of whether 
the appellant was entitled to a new trial after the trial court admitted his prior 
armed robbery conviction without first weighing the probative value and 
prejudicial effects of the admission.  353 S.C. at 408–09, 414, 578 S.E.2d at 34, 37. 
Noting that "[t]here is disagreement among federal circuit courts and state courts 
construing Rule 609(a)(2) as to which crimes are included," the court of appeals 
explained that "[t]he disagreement revolves around whether convictions for theft 
crimes, such as larceny, robbery, and shoplifting, should be admitted under the rule 
as involving dishonesty or false statement."  Id. at 415, 578 S.E.2d at 37.  The 
court of appeals acknowledged that a majority of federal courts has adopted a 
narrow approach to the question, but declined to follow federal precedent, instead 
adopting an expansive approach to determining what constitutes a "crime of
dishonesty or false statement." Id. at 416, 578 S.E.2d at 38. The court of appeals 
reasoned: 
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"An essential element of robbery is that the perpetrator of the offense 
steals the goods and chattels of another or, in the case of an attempt to 
commit robbery, intends to steal the goods or chattels of the person 
assaulted. If this element is not present, the crime is not robbery or an 
attempted robbery. Stealing is defined in law as larceny. Larceny 
involves dishonesty. The fact that the perpetrator of the crime 
manifests or declares his dishonesty by brazenly committing the crime 
does not make him an honest person."  
Id. at 421, 578 S.E.2d at 40–41 (quoting State v. Goad, 692 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1985)).  Thus, the court of appeals concluded, "It is the larcenous 
element of taking property of another which makes the action dishonest. Larceny is 
a lesser-included offense of armed robbery." Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (citations 
omitted).  The court of appeals, citing several dictionary definitions, found further,  
To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those offenses 
which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement or 
misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning of the 
word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a "'disposition to 
lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to deceive, defraud or 
steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts of deceit, fraud, 
cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded as conduct which 
reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity.'" 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
More recently, however, we decided State v. Bryant, in which we held that 
the trial court erroneously admitted the petitioner's prior firearms convictions under 
Rule 609 without weighing the probative value and prejudicial effects of their 
admission because the firearms offenses were not crimes involving dishonesty.  
369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152, 155–56 (2006).  In so holding, we stated: 
Violations of narcotics laws are generally not probative of 
truthfulness. See State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 552 S.E.2d 300 
(2001) (citing State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000)). 
Furthermore, a conviction for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug 
possession, beyond the basic crime itself, is not probative of 
truthfulness. United States v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 
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2002).[5] Likewise, firearms violations also are not generally probative 
of truthfulness. Accordingly, Petitioner's prior firearms convictions do 
not involve dishonesty and their probative value should have been 
weighed against their prejudicial effect prior to their admission 
pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1).
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the State argues that because Bryant involved convictions for firearms
offenses, and not explicitly a prior armed robbery conviction, the above language 
is merely dicta. Therefore, the State relies on earlier precedents from our courts— 
namely Al-Amin—and points to other states' precedents to support its argument that 
armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty, such that no balancing test is required.   
We take this opportunity to overrule Al-Amin, and reaffirm the rule as 
formulated in Bryant that armed robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement for purposes of impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2).  While many states 
have adopted a broader interpretation of the Rule, we find the analysis to be more 
nuanced than that undertaken by the Al-Amin court.6  Under Al-Amin's and the 
5 In Smith, the court stated: 
[E]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement is admissible without regard to its 
prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Smith's forgery conviction 
is admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). However, his convictions for 
robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession convictions are not, as 
the government has not shown that any of them involved false 
statements or acts of deceit beyond the basic crime itself, and as to the 
theft convictions has not shown that it involved items of significant 
value. 
181 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (internal citations omitted). 
6 See Stuart P. Green,  Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
1087, 1119 (2000) ("The problem with [a broad reading of the term 'crime of 
dishonesty'] . . . is that it blurs the moral distinction between stealing and lying. A 
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concurrence's rationale, the exception contained in Rule 609(a)(2), which permits 
the automatic admission of certain prior convictions, swallows the rule contained 
in Rule 609(a)(1), in which discretion regarding the admission of prior convictions 
rests with the trial judge. We think this interpretation is contrary to the intent of 
the Rule. 
Thus, we hold that for impeachment purposes, crimes of "dishonesty or false 
statement" are crimes in the nature of crimen falsi "that bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully." Adams v. State, 644 S.E.2d 426, 431–32 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2007) (footnote omitted) (surveying federal and state treatment of the issue, 
and adopting the more narrow federal definition); see also United States v. Smith,
551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen 
falsi' has encompassed only those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or 
deliberate interference with a court's ascertainment of truth." (emphasis added)). 
Armed robbery, therefore, is not per se probative of truthfulness.
The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically identify crimena falsi in Rule 
609(a)(2), FRE, as crimes which by their very nature permit the impeachment of a 
witness convicted of a crime of "dishonesty or false statement." Green, supra note 
6, at 1090. In fact, 
[t]he original Conference Report makes the link between Rule 
609(a)(2) and the crimena falsi explicit, defining the phrase "crimes 
involving dishonesty or false statement" as "crimes such as perjury, 
subornation of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, 
embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of 
crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's 
propensity to testify truthfully."
Id. at 1090–91 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
person who steals is certainly dishonest; she rejects the idea of making an honest 
living; she cheats; she takes something to which she is not entitled; she disobeys 
the rules. But there is no particular reason to think that she is deceitful. Indeed, 
what little empirical evidence there is indicates that a prior conviction for larceny 
(stealing by stealth) says little or nothing about a witness'[s] propensity to lie." 
(footnote omitted)). 
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93-1037, at 9 (1975)). While the State emphasizes that South Carolina did not 
adopt this explanatory language when it adopted Federal Rule 609, the notion of 
crimen falsi in the evidentiary context is long-established in the common law of 
South Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 282, 14 S.E. 617, 618 
(1892) ("The old, well-settled rule was that one who had been convicted of a crime 
belonging to the class known as the 'crimen falsi' was said to be infamous, and 
incompetent to testify.").  Thus, the State's argument is unavailing.  Cf. Williams v. 
Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 247, 553 S.E.2d 496, 507 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A strong 
presumption . . . exists that the General Assembly does not intend to supplant 
common law principles when enacting legislation." (citations omitted)).7 
Here, the trial judge felt constrained by Al-Amin to forgo a balancing test, 
even though he noted that Al-Amin was a "significant departure" from what he 
understood the law to be, especially because the State sought to admit three prior 
convictions identical to the one for which Respondent was currently on trial.  We 
agree with the trial judge that the prejudicial effect of admitting prior convictions 
for the exact same offense is often very high. See State v. Scriven, 339 S.C. 333, 
343–44, 529 S.E.2d 71, 76–77 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that because the prior 
convictions were "similar or identical to charged offenses, . . . the likelihood of a 
high degree of prejudice to the accused [was] inescapable").  For this reason, a rule 
that places discretion with the trial judge is even more desirable, and unlike the 
concurrence, we think the trial judge is the best arbiter of whether a very 
prejudicial piece of evidence should be admitted in this situation—unless of course 
the prior crime specifically relates to a defendant's penchant to tell the truth on the 
witness stand. Importantly, our holding today does not preclude the admission of 
prior convictions for armed robbery; rather, it merely enables a trial judge to 
conduct a balancing test pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) when the State seeks prior 
7 While the concurrence criticizes our reliance on the federal interpretation of the 
Rules, we note that we routinely look to the federal interpretation of the Rules of 
Evidence to guide us in our interpretation of our own Rules of Evidence.  See, e.g., 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 S.C. 584, 594, 748 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) 
("Because our appellate courts have not definitively addressed Rule 60(b)(5), we 
have looked to the federal courts' interpretation as our rule is similar to the federal 
rule."); Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 474 n.10, 674 S.E.2d 154, 162 
n.10 (2009) ("The language of Rule 26(c), SCRCP, mirrors that of federal Rule 
26(c). Because there is no South Carolina precedent construing this rule, federal 
interpretation of Rule 26(c) is persuasive authority." (citation omitted)). 
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convictions for armed robbery to impeach a criminal defendant's testimony.
Ultimately, the Rule is designed to help the jury discern the truth.  It is not a 
tool for the State to bolster its case against the criminal defendant for the mere fact 
that the defendant has engaged in prior criminal activity.  The balance we strike 
today cuts to the heart of our system's conceptions of fair trial and fair play.      
Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' finding that armed robbery is not a 
crime of "dishonesty or false statement," rendering it admissible pursuant to Rule 
609(a)(2), SCRE.8 
II. Harmless Error 
Next, the State argues that any error in admitting the prior armed robbery 
convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We agree. 
While we agree with the court of appeals that in many instances, the 
admission of identical prior convictions for impeachment purposes enhances its 
prejudicial nature, it does not conclusively render the error so prejudicial that is it 
not subject to a harmless error analysis. Rather,  
[w]hether the improper introduction of this evidence is harmless 
requires us to look at the other evidence admitted at trial to determine 
whether the defendant's "guilt is conclusively proven by competent 
evidence, such that no other rational conclusion could be reached."  
State v. Brooks, 341 S.C. 57, 62–63, 533 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2000) (quoting State v.
Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 234, 433 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1993)).  
Here, the other evidence implicating Respondent in these crimes was 
overwhelming.  Respondent was positively identified by several employees who 
recalled Respondent's distinctive facial features and clothing.  Furthermore, one of 
the employees watched as Respondent's accomplice drove him away from the 
8 We note that—contrary to the concurrence's assertion—whether or not 
shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty has never been decided by this Court and is not 
before us at this time. 
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scene in a dented gray truck, which the police stopped a only a short distance away 
within minutes after the employees reported the robbery.  Inside the getaway 
vehicle, police found Respondent crouching in the floorboard area, sitting adjacent 
to a gun and a bag of money matching the employees' descriptions.   
Therefore, in spite of the error in admitting Respondent's prior convictions 
for armed robbery, we find such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and we reverse the part of the court of appeals' decision finding otherwise.  See,
e.g., State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 334, 563 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2002) ("'Harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt' means the reviewing court can conclude the error did 
not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.").9 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART. 
KITTREDGE and BEATTY, JJ., concur.  HEARN, J., concurring in a 
separate opinion in which PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
9 The State also contends that the court of appeals erred in refusing to remand the 
case to the trial court, and in conducting the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test itself.  
Our harmless error analysis renders the remand issue moot.
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JUSTICE HEARN: I concur in the result reached by the majority.  
However, I would reverse the court of appeals' opinion and hold the trial 
court did not err in admitting Broadnax's prior convictions because armed 
robbery is a crime involving dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Evidence. 
I appreciate the majority's discussion of the similar federal rule and its 
accompanying legislative history. As the majority correctly asserts, the 
federal rule has been interpreted to limit the application of Rule 609(a)(2), 
FRE to those prior convictions of crimes whose central elements involve 
crimen falsi. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362–63 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) ("[I]n its broadest sense, the term 'crimen falsi' has encompassed only 
those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or deliberate interference 
with a court's ascertainment of truth."). 
However, the majority's analysis ignores that neither our rule nor its 
commentary, both of which were promulgated by this Court, contain any 
reference to crimen falsi. Cf. Rule 609 note ("Subsection (a) does change the 
law in South Carolina."). Further, I disagree with the majority that the 
common law somehow contains and thus preserves the concept that crimen 
falsi is the operative standard.  Curiously, the sole case the majority cites to 
support this proposition, State v. Peterson, 35 S.C. 279, 14 S.E. 617 (1892), 
affirmed the trial court's admission of a prior conviction for the exact crime at 
issue today: robbery. Id. at 281, 14 S.E. at 618.  
Accordingly, this Court's interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE must 
be limited to its plain language. The Rule states: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,  
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
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(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Rule 609(a), SCRE (emphasis added). As our court of appeals succinctly 
noted in State v. Al–Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003), the 
operative word for this analysis is "dishonesty."  As elucidated by that court: 
To restrict the application of Rule 609(a)(2) only to those 
offenses which evidence an element of affirmative misstatement 
or misrepresentation of fact would be to ignore the plain meaning 
of the word "dishonesty." "Dishonesty" is, by definition, a 
"'disposition to lie, cheat, or steal.'" "To be dishonest means to 
deceive, defraud or steal." "'In common human experience[,] acts 
of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded 
as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and 
integrity.'" 
Id. at 425, 578 S.E.2d at 43 (internal citations omitted).  Restricting our 
analysis—as we must—to the plain language of 609(a)(2), SCRE there is no 
doubt armed robbery constitutes a crime involving dishonesty. Stealing, even 
more so when done at gunpoint, is essentially the type of behavior reflecting 
adversely on one's character for truthfulness envisioned by Rule 609(a)(2). 
Holding that armed robbery is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to Rule 
609(a)(2) would avoid the perverse result the majority creates, where 
shoplifting is a crime of dishonesty pursuant to State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454, 
492 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1997), but armed robbery is not.10  Further, it 
10 I do not believe the result in this case is dictated by stare decisis.  As the 
majority points out, the Court's decision in State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 
S.E.2d 152, 155–56 (2006), dealt only with the question of whether prior firearm
convictions involve dishonesty. Thus, the Court was not required to reach the 
same issue that is before us today.  See generally State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 19, 
409 S.E.2d 811, 817 (Ct. App. 1991) (Sanders, C.J.) ("[A]ppellate courts in this 
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comports with the outcome a majority of states have reached on the same 
issue. See Jane M. Draper, Annotation, What Constitutes Crime Involving 
“Dishonesty or False Statement” Under Rule 609(a)(2) of Uniform Rules of 
Evidence or Similar State Rule—Crimes Involving Violence or Potential for 
Violence, 83 A.L.R. 277 (2000) (compiling decisions from other 
jurisdictions); see, e.g., Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476 n.18 (Alaska 
1980) ("It is the larceny element of robbery which makes such a conviction 
admissible as impeachment of a witness.").
Accordingly, I would hold the trial court did not err by allowing in 
evidence of Broadnax's prior convictions pursuant to 609(a)(2) because 
armed robbery is a crime involving dishonesty, and would reverse the 
contrary decision of the court of appeals. 
PLEICONES, J., concurs. 
state, like well-behaved children, do not speak unless spoken to and do not answer 
questions they are not asked.").
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JUSTICE BEATTY:  Rushan Counts was convicted of possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana, third offense.  On appeal, Counts contended the 
circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was found 
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at his residence after he opened his door in response to police officers knocking on 
the door. Counts claimed the use of the "knock and talk" investigative technique at 
his home violated his rights under the constitutions of the United States1 and South 
Carolina2 as this procedure constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and 
violated his state right to privacy.  The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed 
Counts' conviction and sentence.  State v. Counts, Op. No. 2012-UP-585 (S.C. Ct. 
App. filed Oct. 31, 2012). This Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We affirm as modified.    
I. Factual / Procedural History 
Prior to trial, Counts moved to suppress the drugs and weapon recovered 
from his home on the ground that law enforcement's search of his home violated 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 
of the South Carolina Constitution. In his written motion, Counts claimed the 
search was unconstitutional because law enforcement did not have a warrant or 
probable cause. Counts maintained that, prior to searching his home, the officers 
failed to corroborate the anonymous tip that precipitated the actions of law 
1  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  
2  Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the 
person or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained. 
S.C. Const. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). 
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enforcement.  Additionally, Counts asserted the plain view doctrine did not apply 
as law enforcement's initial intrusion into his home was not lawful.  
During the pre-trial suppression hearing, Investigator Damon Robinson of 
the Richland County Sheriff's Department testified that in June 2007 he received 
an anonymous tip alleging Counts was selling marijuana and crack cocaine out of 
his mother's house and an apartment in Allen Benedict Court in Columbia.  The 
anonymous tipster provided Counts' name and aliases, the location of Counts'
alleged drug deals, Counts' girlfriend's name, a vehicle license plate number for a 
white Chevy Malibu, the make and model of the car used by Counts' girlfriend, and 
Counts' phone number.  Based on this information, Richland County deputies 
conducted surveillance on the home of Counts' mother and attempted two 
controlled drug buys from the apartment in Allen Benedict Court.  The controlled 
buys were unsuccessful. 
On April 2, 2008, Lieutenant Dave Navarro of the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department received a complaint from an anonymous tipster claiming Counts was 
selling drugs out of his residence. Lieutenant Navarro testified that the tipster 
provided Counts' name and phone number, the name and phone number of Counts'
girlfriend, and identified Counts' vehicle.  The tipster also informed Lieutenant 
Navarro that Counts used multiple identities because Counts knew someone at the 
Department of Motor Vehicles through whom he procured at least two false forms 
of identification. The tipster further stated Counts was selling drugs at a specific 
address and at his girlfriend's apartment in Allen Benedict Court.  The tipster also 
claimed Counts' father was aware of the drug dealing and would cover for him.
The tipster warned Lieutenant Navarro that Counts carried guns everywhere he 
went. 
Lieutenant Navarro discussed this information with Investigator Robinson, 
who confirmed there were two similar tips about Counts. Lieutenant Navarro then 
attempted to corroborate the information provided to him from the tipster by 
reviewing Counts' "rap sheet," which revealed two prior charges of distribution and 
several other drug charges.  He also confirmed that Counts had two identification 
cards on record. Based on this information, Lieutenant Navarro and other 
members of the Richland County Drug Suppression Team conducted surveillance 
of Counts' residence.  Once they identified Counts driving into and entering the 
residence, Lieutenant Navarro decided to conduct a "knock and talk."  According 
to Lieutenant Navarro, a "knock and talk" is a common investigative technique 
used by the sheriff's department during which officers approach a residence and 
explain an allegation to someone who has been accused of wrongdoing.   
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  Lieutenant Navarro, who was accompanied by Deputy Brian Elliott, 
knocked on Counts' door.  When Counts asked the officers to identify themselves, 
Deputy Elliott responded that they were with the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department. Upon Counts' request, Deputy Elliott displayed his badge through the
peephole in the door.  Counts then opened the door.  Both officers testified they 
immediately smelled "the strong odor of marijuana."  Deputy Elliott testified that 
from outside the doorway he saw a "rolled blunt" on the coffee table in the living 
room.  Deputy Elliott immediately said, "600," indicating to Lieutenant Navarro 
that drugs were present.  Both officers described Counts' posture as "bladed," 
which suggested that Counts had a gun. Lieutenant Navarro then observed a silver 
automatic gun in Counts' hand, to which he responded "59, 59," meaning Counts 
was armed.  Once the officers drew their guns and approached Counts, Counts 
dropped his gun and was immediately detained by the officers.   
Both officers testified they performed a protective sweep of the residence 
during which they discovered in plain view a bag of marijuana and a scale in the 
kitchen. A search of Counts' person revealed another bag of marijuana.  Once the 
house was cleared, the officers contacted Investigator Robinson, who obtained a 
search warrant for Counts' residence the same afternoon.  The search revealed 
approximately 800 grams of marijuana, $3,637 in cash, two cell phones, a digital 
scale, two false identification cards with Counts' picture, and three pieces of mail 
addressed to Counts. 
After hearing arguments, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress.  In 
prefacing her ruling, the judge made the following findings of fact:  (1) on April 2, 
2008 the officers received an anonymous tip, which indicated that Counts was 
selling narcotics and identified Counts' name, vehicle, phone number, and his 
girlfriend's name; (2) the sheriff department's investigation revealed that Counts 
drove multiple vehicles, was known to carry weapons, and used multiple aliases; 
(3) during the course of surveillance of Counts' residence, the officers did not 
witness Counts engaging in activity to suggest that he was selling drugs; (4) after 
the officers observed Counts enter the residence, they approached, knocked on the 
door, and identified themselves as law enforcement officers; (5) when Counts 
opened the door both officers detected a "strong odor of marijuana emanating from
inside" the residence; (6) the officers described Counts as standing at the door with 
his "body bladed" in an attempt to conceal a weapon; and (7) the officers observed 
Counts with a gun and, in turn, drew their guns and ordered Counts to drop the 
gun. The judge, however, questioned whether the officers saw the "blunt" on the 
living room table before they entered the residence as the written incident report 
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indicated that Deputy Elliott did not see the "blunt" until after Counts was 
detained. 
Although the trial judge found the officers did not have probable cause at the 
time they went to Counts' residence to either arrest Counts or search his residence, 
the judge ruled that law enforcement did not "need a warrant to do what any 
private citizen may legitimately do, approach a home to speak to the inhabitants."    
Additionally, the judge found that Counts could have refused to answer his door, 
stated that he did not wish to speak with law enforcement, or ordered the officers 
to leave his residence. The judge ultimately found that once Counts opened the 
door and the officers saw him with a gun an exigent circumstance was presented as 
there was a risk of danger to the officers.  The judge also noted the officers were 
aware that Counts was a convicted felon who was known to have guns.  Based on 
this sequence of events, the judge ruled the officers had probable cause to detain 
Counts and then conduct the protective sweep.  Finally, the judge found that once 
the officers observed drugs in plain view they took the necessary steps to procure 
the search warrant. Thus, the judge declined to suppress the evidence as there was 
a "reasonable search" that was "done pursuant to the constitutional protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment."  Ultimately, the jury convicted Counts of 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed in an opinion pursuant 
to Rule 220(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  State v. Counts, Op. 
No. 2012-UP-585 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 31, 2012).  The court found the trial 
judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Counts' motion to suppress.   Id.  In 
support of this decision, the court cited state and federal precedent that permits law 
enforcement, who are not armed with a warrant, to knock on a person's door and 
ask to speak to the occupant of the residence as they do no more than what a 
private citizen might do. Id.  The Court of Appeals did not rule on Counts'
argument that law enforcement's "knock and talk" violated Article I, section 10 of 
the South Carolina Constitution.  Id.
In his petition for rehearing, Counts challenged the court's ruling, but also 
pointed out that the court failed to address his argument regarding the heightened 
privacy protection afforded by the South Carolina Constitution.  Following the 
denial of his petition for rehearing, this Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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II. Standard of Review 
"On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, this 
Court applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse only if there is clear 
error." Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 180-81, 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014); see State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 520, 698 S.E.2d 
203, 205 (2010) (recognizing that in criminal cases an appellate court sits to review 
errors of law only and are, therefore, bound by the trial court's findings unless 
clearly erroneous).
III. Discussion 
A. Arguments 
Counts asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's denial 
of his motion to suppress because law enforcement used the "knock and talk" 
technique to avoid the warrant requirement.  Counts maintains that law 
enforcement violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy. 
Counts acknowledges that the "knock and talk" technique is not per se 
violative of the Fourth Amendment or the parallel provision in the South Carolina 
Constitution. However, he claims it can become so when officers, who do not 
have reasonable suspicion or probable cause, use the technique to circumvent the 
warrant requirement.  In support of this claim, Counts cites United States v. 
Johnson, 170 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1999)3 as providing the "proper analysis" to assess 
3  In Johnson, law enforcement received a citizen report that drug activity was
taking place in an apartment complex.  Johnson, 170 F.3d at 711. Based on this 
report, plain clothes officers went to the complex and intended to use the "knock 
and talk" technique on certain apartments. Id.  As they prepared to knock on one 
apartment door, Johnson emerged at "virtually the same instant."  Id.  The officers 
stopped Johnson and asked whether he had any weapons.  Id. at 712. When 
Johnson did not respond and refused an order to return to the apartment, the 
officers struggled with Johnson. Id.  During the struggle, the officers found a gun 
and cocaine on Johnson's person.  Id.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's order granting Johnson's motion to suppress.  
Although the court referenced the "knock and talk" technique, it found that 
"[w]ithout reasonable suspicion, [law enforcement] cannot detain a person just 
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the constitutionality of the use of the "knock and talk" technique.  Pursuant to 
Johnson and contrary to the trial judge's ruling, Counts asserts that law 
enforcement must have reasonable suspicion before they conduct a "knock and 
talk" at a person's residence.    
Because Counts was the subject of an ongoing investigation, he believes the 
trial judge should have assessed whether the officers had reasonable suspicion, in 
light of the totality of the circumstances, to conduct the "knock and talk" at his 
residence. Had the judge done so, Counts claims there would have been evidence 
to grant his motion to suppress.  Specifically, Counts posits six reasons to show the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion: (1) the information given by the anonymous 
tipster was uncorroborated and unreliable; (2) the officers conducted the "knock 
and talk" with the hope of finding an exigent circumstance that would allow them
to circumvent the warrant requirement; (3) the officers' actions "illustrate that they 
were doing more than a simple 'meet and greet' or investigation" of a complaint as 
they conducted surveillance with the assistance of other members of the Drug 
Suppression Team; (4) the Drug Suppression Team did not attempt a controlled 
buy from Counts or at his residence; (5) law enforcement created the exigent 
circumstance; and (6) the judge noted the inconsistency between Deputy Elliott's 
testimony that he saw a "blunt" from the doorway yet documented a different 
sequence of events in the incident report.   
Alternatively, Counts claims the Court of Appeals erred in failing to analyze 
whether the heightened protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy 
because that individual walks out of an apartment . . . even if some unspecified 
individual . . . thinks something fishy is sometimes going on there."   Id. at 720. 
   For several reasons, we find Counts' reliance on Johnson is misplaced.  Initially, 
as will be discussed, the Seventh Circuit's decision represents a minority position 
with respect to the propriety of the "knock and talk" technique under the Fourth 
Amendment. More importantly, Counts misinterprets the court's ruling.  A close 
reading of the case reveals that the court did not rule that law enforcement must 
have reasonable suspicion before using the "knock and talk" technique.  Rather, the 
Court applied the reasonable suspicion analysis established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), to law enforcement's detention of the suspect who left the residence 
prior to law enforcement conducting the "knock and talk."  Finally, the court in 
Johnson did not address any argument regarding the defendant's right to privacy.  
As a result, Johnson cannot serve as the basis for our analysis regarding Counts'
right to privacy under the South Carolina Constitution. 
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afforded by Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution warranted 
suppression of the drug evidence. Counts explains that there is a distinction 
between a "knock and talk" where an officer has reasonable suspicion and when an 
officer lacks reasonable suspicion prior to approaching a residence.  By 
implication, Counts asserts that a "knock and talk" that lacks reasonable suspicion, 
as in the instant case, is unconstitutional. 
B. "Unreasonable Searches and Seizures" 
a. Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a person's 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
"Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have a warrant in order to 
conduct a search." Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 
(2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014). "Evidence seized in violation of the 
warrant requirement must be excluded from trial."  Id.
"However, a warrantless search may nonetheless be proper under the Fourth 
Amendment if it falls within one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant
requirement." Id.; see State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) 
(recognizing the following exceptions to the warrant requirement:  (1) search 
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile 
exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, (6) consent, and (7) abandonment).  "The 
exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[']s
protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective 
standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant 
exists." State v. Abdullah, 357 S.C. 344, 351, 592 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 
2004); see State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587, 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) 
(acknowledging the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant 
requirement). "For instance, a warrantless search is justified under the exigent 
circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of 
danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling." Abdullah, 357 S.C. at 351, 
592 S.E.2d at 348 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)). "In such 
circumstances, a protective sweep of the premises may be permitted."  Id. (citing 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990)). "A 'protective sweep' is a quick and 
limited search of the premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the 
safety of police officers or others." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
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"In parallel with the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the South 
Carolina Constitution also provides a safeguard against unlawful searches and 
seizures." State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 643, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001); S.C. 
Const. art. I, § 10. "The relationship between the two constitutions is significant 
because '[s]tate courts may afford more expansive rights under state constitutional 
provisions than the rights which are conferred by the Federal Constitution."  
Forrester, 343 S.C. at 643, 541 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 
121, 131 n.13, 489 S.E.2d 617, 625 n.13 (1997)).  "Therefore, state courts can 
develop state law to provide their citizens with a second layer of constitutional 
rights."  Id.  "This relationship is often described as a recognition that the federal 
Constitution sets the floor for individual rights while the state constitution 
establishes the ceiling." Id.  "Thus, this Court can interpret the state protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures in such a way as to provide greater 
protection than the federal Constitution." Id. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 840. 
b. "Knock and Talk" Technique 
In the context of Fourth Amendment analysis, scholars have explained:
One police tactic that courts have increasingly subjected to 
reasonableness review is the procedure known as "knock and talk."  
The "knock and talk" procedure is a common and seemingly 
innocuous procedure that police use proactively, making the 
procedure vulnerable to potential abuse.  The "knock and talk" 
appears innocuous because courts do not generally consider its use a 
search and seizure, but rather an investigative tactic.  The potential for 
abuse arises when police attempt to gain access for consensual 
searches and instead provoke exigencies that normally validate a 
warrantless search.   
Bryan Abramoske, Note, It Doesn't Matter What They Intended: The Need for 
Objective Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in "Knock and Talk"
Investigations, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 561, 562 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
Despite the potential for abuse and the heightened expectation of privacy in 
one's home, the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the "knock 
and talk" technique as constitutionally permissible.  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) ("We have accordingly recognized that 'the knocker on 
the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying 
ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds. . . . Thus, a 
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police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely 
because that is 'no more than any private citizen might do.' " (citations omitted)).   
Moreover, nearly every federal circuit, including the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, has recognized the constitutional propriety of the "knock and talk" 
technique. See United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 2001) ("A 
voluntary response to an officer's knock at the front door of a dwelling does not 
generally implicate the Fourth Amendment, and thus an officer generally does not 
need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify knocking on the door and 
then making verbal inquiry.").  See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits Under 
Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515, 515 (2006 & Supp. 
2015) ("Although the ['knock and talk'] procedure is not per se violative of the 
Fourth Amendment and corresponding state constitutional provisions, police must 
conduct themselves in a manner that does not communicate to a reasonable person 
that he or she is not free to ignore the police presence, and police must remain in 
those areas of the property that are impliedly open to the public.").4 
4 See also United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) ("A 
policeman may lawfully go to a person's home to interview him.  In doing so, he 
obviously can go up to the door." (citations omitted)); United States v. Lucas, 462 
Fed. Appx. 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing as constitutionally permissible 
officer's use of "knock and talk" in approaching defendant's apartment);  In re 
Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that "courts generally 
recognize a 'knock and talk' exception to the warrant requirement"); United States 
v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Federal Courts have recognized the 
'knock and talk' strategy as a reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to 
gain an occupant's consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal 
activity."); United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2005) 
("Consensual encounters do not lose their propriety, moreover, merely because 
they take place at the entrance of a citizen's home.  A number of courts, including 
this one, have recognized 'knock and talk' consensual encounters as a legitimate 
investigative technique at the home of a suspect or an individual with information 
about an investigation."); United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 
1997) (recognizing that a "knock and talk" is ordinarily consensual unless coercive 
circumstances exist); United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679 (8th Cir. 2011) 
("This principle permits police officers—consistent with the Fourth Amendment— 
to 'approach[ ] the front door to announce their presence,' make 'inquir[ies],' and 
'request consent to search the remainder of the property,' 'commonly referred to as 
a 'knock and talk.' " (quoting United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 
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Similar to federal precedent, this Court has found that "police ha[v]e the 
investigative authority to approach the front door of [a] home in order to 
investigate [the] anonymous tip."  State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 445, 706 S.E.2d 
324, 328 (2011). 
Applying the above-outlined principles to the facts of the instant case, we 
find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial judge's denial of Counts'
motion to suppress because the actions of law enforcement did not constitute an 
unreasonable search and seizure under either the state or federal constitution.  We 
discern no error of law in the judge's analysis and there is evidence to support the 
judge's findings of fact that once Counts, a known felon, voluntarily opened the 
door, an exigent circumstance arose when the officers saw that he had a weapon.  
Significantly, Counts requested that the officers provide identification before he 
opened the door. Yet, even after they provided proof of their law enforcement 
authority, Counts opened the door armed with a handgun.   Because there was a 
risk of danger to the officers, the officers were justified under the exigent 
circumstances doctrine to detain Counts and conduct a protective sweep of his 
residence. A search of Counts' person revealed a bag of marijuana.  During the 
protective sweep, the officers also observed drugs and a scale in plain view, which 
provided them with probable cause to procure a search warrant.  Accordingly, we 
affirm this portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.      
C. "Unreasonable Invasions of Privacy" 
Our ruling, however, does not conclude the analysis as the question becomes 
whether the officers' actions constituted a violation of Counts' state constitutional 
right against unreasonable invasions of privacy. 
2006))); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that "no suspicion needed to be shown in order to justify the 'knock and talk' "); 
United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("As 
commonly understood, a 'knock and talk' is a consensual encounter and therefore 
does not contravene the Fourth Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion."); 
United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The Fourth 
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government, is not implicated by entry upon private land to knock on a citizen's
door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises.").
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a. South Carolina Invasion of Privacy Jurisprudence 
As previously stated, the South Carolina Constitution provides citizens an 
express right to privacy. S.C. Const. art. I, § 10.  But, other than the use of the 
word "unreasonable" to modify this right, there are no parameters concerning the 
right or a definition of what constitutes "unreasonable invasions of privacy."  As a 
result, legal scholars interpreting the legislative history of this constitutional 
provision have concluded that "the drafters were depending upon the state judiciary 
to construct a precise meaning of this phrase."  Jaclyn L. McAndrew, Who Has 
More Privacy?: State v. Brown and Its Effect on South Carolina Criminal 
Defendants, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 671, 694 (2011). As will be discussed, our state 
jurisprudence is scant on the right to privacy.  Thus, this case presents us with an 
opportunity to further define this state constitutional right.      
Although several appellate decisions in this state make a passing reference to 
the right to privacy,5 our most comprehensive discussion to date is contained in 
State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001) and State v. Weaver, 374 
S.C. 313, 649 S.E.2d 479 (2007). 
In Forrester, the defendant was approached by law enforcement for 
questioning after officers observed the defendant exhibiting suspicious behavior at 
a local train station.  Forrester, 343 S.C. at 640, 541 S.E.2d at 839. According to
the investigating officer, he identified himself to the defendant who agreed to let 
him search her luggage.  Id.  Because the defendant was clutching her purse 
tightly, the officer asked to search the purse.  Id.  The defendant opened the purse 
to allow the officer to look inside.  Id. at 641, 541 S.E.2d at 839.  Without 
requesting permission to search the interior of the purse, the officer took the purse 
and tore open the lining at which time he found crack cocaine.  Id.  On appeal from 
her conviction, the defendant argued that she did not give consent to the officer to 
5 See, e.g., State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) 
("Private residences are places in which an individual normally expects privacy 
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is 
one society recognizes as justifiable. Accordingly, searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances."); State v. Houey, 375 S.C. 106, 651 S.E.2d 314 (2007) (finding 
that requiring defendant, who was charged with second-degree CSC with a minor, 
to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases was not overly intrusive or so 
unreasonable as to render statutory authority for this test violative of the South 
Carolina Constitution). 
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search her purse and, thus, the crack cocaine was discovered in violation of the 
express right to privacy found in Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina 
Constitution. Id. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841. This Court disagreed, finding our state 
constitutional provision did not require informed consent prior to government 
searches.  Id. at 647-48, 541 S.E.2d at 842-43.
In so ruling, we compared this state's right to privacy with the ten other 
states that have express right to privacy provisions in their constitutions.  Id. at 
646, 541 S.E.2d at 841-42. We noted, "South Carolina and five other states have 
their right to privacy provision included in the section prohibiting unreasonable 
search and seizures," which in turn "creates a distinct privacy right that applies 
both within and outside the search and seizure context."  Id. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 
841. Consequently, this Court concluded that "[t]he South Carolina Constitution, 
with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level 
of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment."  Id. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841. 
Notwithstanding the broader privacy protection afforded by our state constitutional 
provision, this Court ultimately rejected the defendant's argument that suspects 
must be informed of their right to refuse consent to search.  Id. at 647-48, 541 
S.E.2d at 842-43. Specifically, we stated, "while our state constitution may 
provide a higher level of protection in the search and seizure context, it does not go 
so far as to require informed consent prior to government searches."  Id.
Although the Court found that our state constitution did not require the 
investigating officer to inform Forrester of her right to refuse giving consent to 
search her purse, the Court reversed Forrester's conviction.  Id. at 648, 541 S.E.2d 
at 843. The Court found that the law enforcement officer "exceeded the scope of 
Forrester's consent when he proceeded beyond the visual inspection of the purse 
granted by Forrester to an intense physical examination of the purse."  Id.  As a 
result, the Court held that the crack cocaine should have been excluded at trial.  Id.
Six years later, this Court again acknowledged the higher level of privacy 
protection afforded by our state constitution. In Weaver, the defendant was 
convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a 
violent crime following a shooting at a nightclub.  Weaver, 374 S.C. at 317, 649 
S.E.2d at 480. The investigation of the shooting led law enforcement to the home
of the defendant's cousin where they discovered the vehicle that had been driven by 
the defendant parked in the backyard. Id. at 317, 649 S.E.2d at 481. According to 
the defendant's cousin, the defendant had recently been at the home and asked for a 
change of clothes, some bleach, and a garbage bag.  Id.  The defendant then left the 
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home.  Id.  Upon finding the vehicle driven by the defendant, the investigating 
officer opened the door and discovered the inside of the vehicle was wet and 
smelled of bleach. Id. at 318, 649 S.E.2d at 481. The officer also found a "bag of 
wash" that smelled like bleach in a nearby area.  Id.  Based on this evidence, the 
officers impounded the vehicle and processed it.  Id.  The investigating officers 
found blood in the vehicle that matched that of the shooting victim.  Id.  On appeal, 
the defendant argued the evidence found in the vehicle should have been 
suppressed as it was the product of an impermissible warrantless search.  Id. 
This Court rejected the defendant's contention, finding the warrantless 
search met the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 319-21, 649 
S.E.2d at 482. However, the Court also analyzed whether the search and seizure 
violated the defendant's right to privacy pursuant to the South Carolina 
Constitution. Id. at 321, 649 S.E.2d at 483. Citing Forrester, the majority noted 
the South Carolina Constitution affords a higher level of privacy protection than 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Despite this broad protection, the majority declined to 
find the privacy provision required a warrant before the search and seizure of a 
vehicle located in the backyard of a private residence.  Id. at 322, 649 S.E.2d at 
483. The majority explained that "[t]he focus in the state constitution is on 
whether the invasion of privacy is reasonable, regardless of the person's 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle to be searched.  Once the officers have 
probable cause to search a vehicle, the state constitution's requirement that the 
invasion of one's privacy be reasonable will be met."  Id.
Justice Pleicones concurred in the result reached by the majority.  However, 
he wrote separately, and was joined by Chief Justice Toal, to express his 
disagreement with the majority's analysis of the vehicle seizure under the South 
Carolina Constitution. Id. at 324, 649 S.E.2d at 484. Justice Pleicones found the 
majority's analysis was incomplete as he believed it was necessary to "further 
analyze the impact of [the privacy] provision on the second prong of a Fourth
Amendment automobile analysis," which included "the expectation of privacy in a 
private automobile."  Id. at 325, 649 S.E.2d at 484-85. Under the facts of the case, 
Justice Pleicones found no state constitutional violation because the defendant was 
not the owner of the vehicle that was seized and the vehicle was not parked at the 
defendant's residence. Id. at 326, 649 S.E.2d at 485. Justice Pleicones, however, 
emphasized that "[o]ur state constitution's provision protecting unreasonable 
invasions of privacy necessarily requires some analysis of the privacy interests 
involved when a warrantless seizure is made on private property."  Id. 
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As demonstrated by our decisions in Forrester and Weaver, this Court has 
sought to guard our state citizens' constitutional right to privacy but still give 
credence to the government's interest in conducting legitimate searches.  While 
Forrester and Weaver provide some general guidance, these decisions are not 
dispositive of the instant case.  Therefore, we have looked to other state 
jurisdictions to see how those courts address the propriety of the "knock and talk" 
technique in the context of a state right to privacy. 
b. Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in other jurisdictions have assessed what law enforcement procedure 
is necessary to protect a citizen's right to privacy.  Specifically, the courts have 
analyzed whether law enforcement needs to:  (1) have probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to approach the private residence; or (2) inform the citizen of 
his or her right to refuse consent to search. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 
722 (Ark. 2004) (holding, pursuant to state constitutional implicit right to privacy, 
officers using the "knock and talk" technique must apprise the homeowner of his 
right to refuse to consent to search); State v. Sanders, 374 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1979) 
(finding "knock and talk" did not violate right to privacy even though no cause to 
arrest existed when resident opened the door); State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 934 
(Wash. 1998) (concluding "knock and talk" procedure violated state constitutional 
right to privacy where law enforcement failed to advise resident that she could 
refuse to give consent to search her home; stating, "unlike a search warrant, a 
search resulting from a knock and talk need not be supported by probable cause, or 
even reasonable suspicion"). See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits Under 
Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515, §§ 33-34 (2006 & 
Supp. 2015) (collecting state and federal cases analyzing the use of the "knock and 
talk" technique under federal and state constitution).   
After reviewing the analyses in other jurisdictions in conjunction with 
Forrester and Weaver, we are not persuaded by the decisions of other states that 
require an officer to inform a citizen of his or her right to refuse consent to search 
as we specifically rejected this requirement in another context.  Even though 
Forrester involved a search of the contents of the defendant's purse, this Court 
used strong language to disavow the need for informed consent prior to 
government searches.  See Forrester, 343 S.C. at 647-48, 541 S.E.2d at 842-43 
("[W]hile our state constitution may provide a higher level of protection in the 
search and seizure context, it does not go so far as to require informed consent 
prior to government searches.").  We decline to depart from this position.  
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Therefore, we find the lack of an admonition in the instant case did not vitiate 
Counts' voluntary consent to search.    
However, as the concurrence emphasized in Weaver, "[o]ur state 
constitution's provision protecting unreasonable invasions of privacy necessarily 
requires some analysis of the privacy interests involved when a warrantless seizure 
is made on private property." Weaver, 374 S.C. at 326, 649 S.E.2d at 485 
(Pleicones, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Because the privacy interests in one's
home are the most sacrosanct, we believe there must be some threshold evidentiary 
basis for law enforcement to approach a private residence.  Otherwise, we foresee 
the potential for abuse if law enforcement targets a neighborhood and 
indiscriminately knocks on doors with the hope of discovering contraband without 
a search warrant. Although the State maintains these encounters are entirely 
consensual, we cannot ignore the nature of the "knock and talk" procedure.  In 
contrast to a routine sales call, the "knock and talk" technique is inherently
coercive as it is conducted by law enforcement and not a private citizen.    
Yet, rather than enunciating an unyielding rule or eliminating the "knock and 
talk" technique in its entirety, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity at a targeted residence prior to approaching the 
residence and knocking on the door. As with our previous right-to-privacy 
decisions, we find this rule safeguards the express constitutional right against 
unreasonable invasions of privacy and does not hamper law enforcement in their 
investigative efforts. 
Furthermore, we believe this decision does not exceed the bounds of our 
judicial authority as conferred by the drafters of the right-to-privacy provision.  In 
fact, our ruling effectuates the intent of the Legislature to afford heightened 
protection against intrusions into a citizen's home.  As evidenced by the enactment 
of the "Protection of Persons and Property Act," the Legislature has recognized the 
sanctity of one's home and sought to ensure a citizen's right to protect it.  S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (Supp. 2014).6  Our ruling acknowledges this 
6  The Act codifies the common law Castle Doctrine and provides immunity from
criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly force in those 
circumstances that are permitted by the Act, including the defense of one's home.  
See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-420(A) (Supp. 2014) (acknowledging that the 
Legislature intended "to codify the common law Castle Doctrine[,] which 
recognizes that a person's home is his castle and to extend the doctrine to include 
an occupied vehicle and the person's place of business"); id. § 16-11-450(A) 
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legislative pronouncement and gives greater protection to South Carolina citizens 
than that of the federal constitution.
D. Application 
Applying this rule to the facts of the instant case, we find the trial judge 
correctly denied Counts' motion to suppress.  Although the judge did not employ 
our newly enunciated rule, we nevertheless conclude that her findings of fact 
establish that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity prior to 
conducting the "knock and talk" at Counts' residence.  Notably, law enforcement 
received two separate anonymous tips from citizens who alleged that Counts was 
selling drugs. These tips also identified vehicles driven by Counts, his phone 
number, and his use of multiple identities.  Through their investigation, the officers 
confirmed that Counts had two false identification cards on record and had prior 
drug convictions.  In light of this evidence, the officers were not randomly 
knocking on Counts' door but had reasonable suspicion to support their decision to 
approach Counts' residence and conduct the "knock and talk."   
As previously discussed, the officers were justified under the exigent 
circumstances doctrine to detain Counts and conduct a protective sweep of his 
residence. The drugs and scale found during the search of Counts' person and the 
protective sweep of his residence established probable cause for the officers to 
procure a search warrant. Accordingly, we affirm Counts' conviction and sentence 
as the evidence that formed the basis of the drug charge was properly admitted for 
the jury's consideration.   
IV. Conclusion 
Given the extensive precedent supporting the constitutional propriety of the 
"knock and talk" technique, we hold the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the 
judge's finding that there was no unreasonable search and seizure under either the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the parallel provision of 
the South Carolina Constitution.  The Court of Appeals, however, erred in failing 
to rule on Counts' argument regarding the heighten privacy protection afforded by 
the South Carolina Constitution.  For our state constitutional right to privacy to 
(providing that "[a] person who uses deadly force as permitted by the provisions of 
this article or another applicable provision of law is justified in using deadly force 
and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly 
force . . . ."). 
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have any significance, we believe there must be some minimum evidentiary 
standard met before law enforcement conduct a warrantless search of a South 
Carolina citizen's home.  Therefore, we hold that law enforcement must have 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching the targeted residence 
and conducting the "knock and talk" investigative technique.7 
Here, there is evidence that law enforcement officers met this threshold 
requirement before conducting the "knock and talk" at Counts' residence.  
Moreover, the officers were justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to 
detain Counts and conduct a protective sweep of his residence.  The drugs and 
7 Although the concurrence agrees with our ultimate conclusion, the concurrence 
"would not require law enforcement officers to have a reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity occurring in the home in order to 'knock and talk.'"  We should not 
lose sight of the fact that "knock and talk" is a criminal investigative technique 
used for the sole purpose of discovering criminal activity.  In Justice Pleicones' 
concurrence in Weaver, he expressly stated that "[o]ur state constitution's provision 
protecting unreasonable invasions of privacy necessarily requires some analysis of 
the privacy interests involved when a warrantless seizure is made on private 
property."  Weaver, 374 S.C. at 326, 649 S.E.2d at 485 (emphasis added).  We 
believe the privacy interests in one's home are precisely what our state 
constitutional provision was intended to protect.  Further, as supporting precedent, 
the concurrence cites Bash. However, the court in Bash did not analyze whether 
the "knock and talk" violated our state right to privacy.  Rather, the decision 
involved a determination of whether law enforcement conduct, which was initiated 
with a "knock and talk," violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.   
   Finally, the concurrence's fear that our decision will prevent law enforcement 
from conducting "welfare checks" at residences is unfounded.  A "welfare check" 
is not a criminal investigative technique.  As its name implies, a "welfare check" is 
conducted by law enforcement based upon concern for a person's welfare not to 
inquire about illegal activity at the residence.  In the instance of a "welfare check," 
the implicit license to approach a home as referenced in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. 1409 (2013) is applicable. Thus, our decision should not be misconstrued, as 
done by the concurrence, to prevent law enforcement from conducting "welfare 
checks" at residences.  We emphasize that our holding is limited to requiring law 
enforcement to have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching a 
targeted residence and conducting the "knock and talk" criminal investigative 
technique.
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scale found during the search of Counts' person and the protective sweep of his 
residence established probable cause for the officers to procure a search warrant.  
As a result, we find the evidence that formed the basis of the drug charge was 
properly admitted for the jury's consideration.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
HEARN and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., concurring 
in a separate opinion in which TOAL, C.J. concurs. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I concur in the majority's decision to affirm petitioner's 
conviction and sentence, but write separately as I do not believe that the privacy 
clause of S.C. Const. art. I, § 10 (2007) altered the common understanding that a 
law enforcement officer, like other individuals, has an "implicit license . . . to 
approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, 
and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave."  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 
1409, 1415 (2013). An officer who does not have a warrant "may approach a 
home and knock precisely because that is 'no more than any private citizen might 
do.'" Id. at 1416 citing Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011). 
While I appreciate the majority's thorough treatment of the subject, and share their 
concern at the potential for coercion when a citizen is confronted by officers on her 
porch,8 I would not require law enforcement officers to have a reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity occurring in the home in order to "knock and talk."  Cf. 
State v. Bash, Op. No. 5314 (S.C. Ct. App. filed April 22, 2015) (analyzing "knock 
and talk" under the Fourth Amendment).  Most particularly, I would not prevent 
law enforcement from conducting welfare checks at residences.  However, were 
they to conduct the type of neighborhood-wide sweep feared by the majority, I 
would find that type of conduct indicative of coercion that could, in certain 
circumstances, vitiate the individual's consent to a search of her home. 
I concur in the majority's decision to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
TOAL, C.J. concurs.
8 I do not agree, however, that the "Protection of Persons and Property Act" 
provides support for the majority's reading of the constitution as the Act 
specifically exempts from the presumption of reasonable fear "a law enforcement 
officer who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling or residence . . . in the 
performance of his official duties . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(B)(4) (Supp. 
2014); see also § 16-11-450(A) (Supp. 2014) (no immunity for killing of officer). 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter Jennifer Elizabeth Meehan, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001427 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR) based on federal indictments for wire fraud, bank fraud and 
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 
activity. The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre Lumpkin, 
Esquire, to protect the interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, 
Rule 413, SCACR. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Lumpkin is hereby appointed pursuant to 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to assume responsibility for respondent's client 
files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law 
office accounts respondent may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as 
required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of 
respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's
trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this 
appointment. 
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that the Receiver, 
Peyre Lumpkin, has been duly appointed by this Court.
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Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre Lumpkin, has been duly appointed by 
this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the authority to
direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July 2, 2015 
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